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THE THORNHIL DOCTRINE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ALCHEmY
At the turn of the last decade, Justice Murphy delivered the majority
opinion in Thornhill v. Alabama,' a decision which recognized peace-
ful picketing as a constitutional right. He said: 2
The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Consti-
tution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truth-
fully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of
subsequent punishment. ....
In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information
concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that
area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution. . . .
Abridgment of the liberty of such discussion can be justified only
where the dear danger of substantive evils arises under the circum-
stances affording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by competi-
tion for acceptance in the market of public opinion. We hold that the
danger of injury to an industrial concern is neither so serious nor so
imminent as to justify the sweeping proscription of freedom of dis-
cussion embodied in [the Alabama statute].
Within the short span of ten years, the sanctity of the right of free
discussion by means of peaceful picketing has been largely disregarded.
The present state of the law is reflected by a decision of a lower New
York court, where it was stated: 3
. . . "a state is not required to tolerate in all places and all circum-
stances even peaceful picketing by an individual, notwithstanding the
guaranty by the Fourteenth Amendment of the right to 'free speech.'"
.. .Clearly congregating in front of plaintiff's premises and interfering
with her business cannot by any stretch of the imagination be deemed
to be the exercise of defendant's constitutional right of free speech.
In a recent Ohio case 4 the court stated that peaceful picketing is
subject to reasonable restriction and may be enjoined if it is carried
on for an unlawful objective or if it lacks a rational connection with
the labor dispute. To the same effect is a 1950 decision of the Su-
preme Court of Florida.5
1 310 U. S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940).
2 Id., 310 U. S. at 101-5.
3 Fay Loevin Apparel Shops, Inc. v. Harlem Labor Union, Inc .. Misc .....
92 N. Y. S. (2d) 776, 779-80 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
4 Dummermuth et, al. v. Hykes et al .. Ohio App ....., 95 N. E. (2d) 32,
38 (1950).
5 Local Union No. 519 v. Robertson, Fla ....., 44 So. (2d) 899, 903-4
(1950).
NOTES
A trilogy of case, Building Service Employees International Union,
Local 262 v. Gazzam, 6 Hughes v. Superior Court of California,7 and
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 309 v. Hanke,8 all de-
cided on May 8, 1950, have contributed significantly to the confu-
sion surrounding the Thornhill doctrine. In the Gazzam case, the
Court concluded that the picketing was in reality an attempt to com-
pel the employer to violate a state statute, and that the picketing
could be .enjoined without encroaching upon rights protected from
state abridgment by the Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, a
restraint based upon an important and widely accepted public policy
is constitutional. In the Hughes case the Court upheld an injunction
of peaceful picketing where its sole object was to compel the hiring
of a proportionate share of Negro employees. The picketing sub-
verted the public policy of the state as expressed by the state's
courts. Similarly, in the Hanke decision, the Court declared that
picketing, even though peaceful, could be enjoined if an unlawful
objective was its sole aim. Here the picketing was against a self-
employer to force a union shop upon him. These cases demonstrate
that picketing which violates the public policy of a state may be en-
joined.
The irony of the entire situation is that the Thornhill doctrine is
still the law. At least it never has been expressly repudiated.
I.
The Evolution of Free Speech
In order to fully comprehend the importance of this paradox, it
is necessary to survey briefly the evolution of "free speech." Be-
fore World War I the Blackstonian principle prevailed that there
must be no "previous restraint" upon expression. 9 Harsh realities
such as grave national dangers proved this theory to be impracticable,
and the Espionage Acts of 1917 and 1918 10 completely obliterated
it.
6 339 U. S. 532, 70 S. Ct. 784, 94 L. Ed. 1045 (1950).
7 339 U. S. 460, 70 S. Ct. 718, 94 L. Ed. 985 (1950).
8 339 U. S. 470, 70 S. Ct. 773, 94 L. Ed. 995 (1950).
9 4 BL. Comm. *151-2: "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the
nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon
publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when pub-
lished. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases
before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if
he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the con-
sequences of his own temerity."
10 40 StAr. 219 (1917), as amended, 40 STAT. 553 (1918). The 1918 statute
provided: "Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make ...
false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the
military or naval forces of the United States, or to promote the success of its
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The courts during and after the war seized upon two tests for
determining whether an individual had violated the Espionage Acts:
conspiracy, involving presumptive intent, and dangerous tendency."
No speech repugnant to these subjective criteria was tolerated. It
became evidence of a violation of these Acts to discourage the pur-
chase of bonds; 12 to state that conscription was unconstitutional,
though the Supreme Court had not yet held it valid; 13 or to state
that war was contrary to the teachings of Christ.' 4 Men were con-
victed for saying that "this is a capitalists' war," 15 and that "the
government is for profiteers." 16 In Minnesota it was held to be sup-
porting evidence of deterring assistance to the United States in the
prosecution of the war to discourage women from knitting by the
remark, "no soldier ever sees these socks." 17 It was unnecessary
that these expressions of opinion be addressed to soldiers or men on
the point of enlisting or being drafted; it was sufficient if the words
might conceivably reach them.' 8
These vague and indeterminate tests were aptly criticized by
Ernst Freund: 19
So long as we apply the notoriously loose common law doctrines
of conspiracy and incitement to offenses of a political character, we are
adrift on a sea of doubt and conjecture. To know what you may do
and what you may not do, and how far you may go in criticism, is the
first condition of political liberty; to be permitted to agitate at your
own peril, subject to a jury's guessing at motive, tendency and possible
effect, makes the right of free speech a precarious gift.
enemies .. .and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause
or attempt to cause, or incite or attempt to incite, insubordination, disloyalty,
mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States...
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,00 or imprisonment for not
more than twenty years, or both. .... "
11 Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, 19 NEw R umic 13
(1919). Freund pointed out that the courts stressed the dangerous tendency
of the words uttered in order to find the defendant guilty of obstructing the
military effort under the Espionage Acts during World War I. He criticized
this by arguing that acts provoked by words and not words alone were re-
quired to effect an obstruction.
12 United States v. Frerichs, U. S. Justice Dept., Interpretation of War
Statutes, Bulletin No. 85.
13 United States v. Kirchner, U. S. Justice Dept., Interpretation of War
Statutes, Bulletin No. 69.
14 Shaffer v. United States, 255 Fed. 886 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 251
U. S. 552, 40 S. Ct. 57, 64 L. Ed. 410 (1919).
15 United States v. Pierce, U. S. Justice Dept., Interpretation of War
Statutes, Bulletin No. 52.
16 United States v. Stokes, U. S. Justice Dept., Interpretation of War
Statutes, Bulletin No. 106.
17 State v. Freerks, 140 Minn. 349, 168 N. W. 23, 24 (1918).
18 Kirchner v. United States, 255 Fed. 301 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 249
U. S. 595, 39 S. Ct. 260, 63 L. Ed. 794 (1918).
19 Freund, supra note 11, at 14.
NOTES
In 1925, the decision in Gitlow v. New York 20 was symptomatic
of the fact that the Supreme Court was experiencing deep concern in
attempting to discover a solution for the problem caused by state
abridgment of civil rights. This decision clearly established that the
guaranty of free speech in the First Amendment was included in the
word "liberty" in the Fourteenth-free speech was endowed with a
dignity that had to be respected by both the Federal Government
and the states. Chafee remarked: 21
A profit and loss account of the Gitlow case immediately after it was
decided showed one big gain, the possibility of federal protection against
state suppression. Now that the Court's power to protect liberty of speech
under the Fourteenth Amendment had been decisively established, that
power was bound to be exercised sooner or later to reverse convictions.
And so a more liberal Court could prevent the United States from
becoming a checkerboard nation, with ultra-conservative states into
which moderately radical Americans would come at peril of imprisonment
for sedition.
Lovell v. Griffin 22 held that liberty of the press is not confined
to newspapers and periodicals, but embraces pamphlets and leaflets as
well. In this case, the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance
which forbade the distribution of advertisements or other literature
without prior permission from the city manager, thus incorporating
freedom of the press into the concept of liberty of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Near v. Minnesota23  confirmed this addition with
cogency. In Cantwell v. Connecticut,24 the Court incorporated free-
dom of religious expression; in Hague v. C. I. 0.25 and in De Jonge
v. Oregon,2 6 it added freedom of assembly. It thus became appar-
ent that the Court viewed the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment as including all of the rights necessary for the uninhibited
cultivation of the faculties of self-expression. 27
II.
The Thornhill Doctrine-Recognition of a Personal Economic Right
In 1940, with the introduction of the Thornhill doctrine into the
judicial drama, the Supreme Court added another link to the civil
liberty chain, for it there recognized that an individual has an eco-
20 268 U. S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 (1923).
21 Cmr xpn, FREE SPEFECH n TH UNITED STATES 324 (1946).
22 303 U. S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938).
23 283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931).
24 310 U. S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940).
25 307 U. S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423 (1938).
26 299 U. S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278 (1937).
27 See Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753, et al. v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S. 287, 293, 61 S. Ct. 552, 85 L. Ed. 836
(1941).
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nomic right to use forms of speech to secure improved working condi-
tions, and that this personal civil right takes precedence over mere
property rights.
The philosophy underlying the Thornhill case is relatively simple,
and is not nearly as drastic as many critics claim. Whatever views
one may entertain toward this decision, it must be admitted that it is
a logical sequitur in light of the previous civil liberty cases. The
Court undoubtedly felt that the liberties protected by the First
Amendment and woven to a certain extent into the texture of the
Fourteenth were, to a great degree, illusory in modern industrial so-
ciety unless the individual is guaranteed the economic right to main-
tain a reasonable level of subsistence in order to be able to realize
his constitutional liberties. In the inevitable clash between property
rights and personal economic rights, the former must give way.
28
It must be realized that the methods used by the pickets did not
differ materially from those which were allowed in the previous civil
liberty cases. The only real distinction is in the effect which these
methods have upon the public. Picketing ofttimes evokes severe
emotional reactions from the public while other civil liberty demon-
strations generally do not; at least any public response is on a much
smaller scale. The emotional stress created by picketing presents a
serious obstacle to the courts in the calm and logical determination
of the issues. The unfortunate result is that the tribunal will often fail
to recognize the right to communicate the facts of a labor dispute
by picketing as a constitutional right, but instead will give control-
ling consideration to the effect of the picketing upon the public. If
peaceful picketing is a constitutional right, it should be accorded
all the protective enforcement that surrounds the other constitutional
rights.2 9  If it is free speech, the protection which should be ex-
tended to it should be broad and sweeping, for free speech is the
matrix and necessary condition of all constitutional liberties.
III.
The Perversion of the Thornhill Doctrine
By its decision in 1942 in Carpenters and Joiners Union of Amer-
ica, Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe,30 the Supreme Court served notice
that no one, including itself, understood the precise nature of the
right of free speech. The Court upheld a ban on picketing though
28 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093
(1940).
29 See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U. S. 147, 60 S. Ct. 146 ,84 L. Ed.
155 (1939); Palko v.'Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed.
288 (1937).
30 315 U. S. 722, 62 S. Ct. 807, 86 L. Ed. 1143 (1942).
NOTES
there was no showing of violence, past, present, or threatened. The
union had picketed a restaurant because it was then engaged in a
dispute with a contractor employed by the restaurant owner to erect
a building which was in no way connected with the restaurant. Speak-
ing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter emphasized the fact that the
person picketed was not involved in the labor dispute and maintained
that Texas had a right to declare it contrary to its public policy for
a union "to conscript neutrals having no relation to either the dispute
or the industry." 31 The decision in effect outlawed all secondary
picketing. The Court said: 32
As a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute, peaceful
picketing may be a phase of the constitutional right of free utterance.
But recognition of peaceful picketing as an exercise of free speech does
not imply that the states must be without power to confine the sphere
of communication to that directly related to the dispute. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Contemporaneously with the Ritter decision, the doctrine of illegal
objective appeared as a limitation on the right to picket. It was
held in Bakery & Pastry'Drivers & Helpers, Local 802 v. Wohl that
peaceful picketing may be enjoined if it is carried on for an illegal
purpose.33 A forceful re-emphasis of this proposition was made in
Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co.,34 in which the union was
picketing an ice manufacturer to compel it to refuse to sell ice to
peddlers with whom the union had a dispute. The injunction en-
joining the picketing was sustained on the ground that were the ice
manufacturer to do as the union wished, it would have to violate
the state antitrust law. After reviewing a number of cases,35 includ-
ing the Thornhill decision,36 the Court stated that none of them es-
tablished the constitutional right of picketers ". . . to violate valid
laws designed to protect important interests of society." 37
These cases reveal that the Court returned to the states power to
enjoin not only the picket line itself, but also picketing in undesir-
31 Id., 315 U. S. at 728.
32 Id., 315 U. S. at 727.
33 315 U. S. 769, 62 S. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178 (1942).
34 336 U. S. 490, 69 S. Ct. 684, 93 L. Ed. 834 (1949).
35 Carpenters and Joiners Union of America, Local 213 et al. v. Ritter's
Cafe et al., 315 U. S. 722, 62 S. Ct. 807, 86 L. Ed. 1143 (1942); Bakery and
Pastry Drivers and Helpers, Local 802 v. Wol, 315 U. S. 769, 62 S. Ct. 816,
86 L. Ed. 1178 (1942); Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 746,
84 L. Ed. 1104 (1940) (ordinance void under Fourteenth Amendment for de-
priving employees and union members of right of free speech); Senn v. Tile
Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468, 57 S. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229 (1937)
(refusal sustained of injunction against picketing which kept a self-employed
person from his work).
36 310 U. S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940).
37 Giboney et al. v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 501, 69
S. Ct. 684, 93 L. Ed. 834 (1949).
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able places, at objectionable times, and for illegal purposes. The
two basic tests which the Court established in these cases are the
illegal objective test of the Wohl and Giboney cases, and the unity
of interest test found in the Ritter's Cafe decision. These two tests
are reminiscent of the conspiracy and dangerous tendency standards
applied under the 1917-18 Espionage Acts. Upon close examination
it seems that the Wohl-Giboney illegal objective test is in substance
the conspiracy test, and that the Ritter's Cafe unity of interest test
is merely a restatement of the dangerous tendency test.
Until the Ritter's Cafe case, the Court had consistently applied
the clear and present danger test to peaceful picketing. In this case,
however, the emphasis was upon the unlawful aspect, the dangerous
tendency of the secondary boycott, rather than upon the clear and
present danger created by the words or speech. The Court in so
holding decided that an individual's right to pursue economic rela-
tions with those of his choosing, whether union or non-union, is
sometimes superior to a union's unrestrained right of free speech.
This is direct refutation of the Thornhill doctrine which apparently
placed the personal right of free speech in economic matters above all
property rights. In the Ritter's Cafe case the Court declared: 38
In forbidding such conscription of neutrals, in the circumstances of
the case before us, Texas represents the prevailing, and probably the
unanimous, policy of the states. We hold that the Constitution does not
forbid Texas to draw the line which has been drawn here. To hold
otherwise would be to transmute vital constitutional liberties into doc-
trinaire dogma. We must be mindful that "the rights of employers and
employees to conduct their economic affairs and to compete with others
for a share in the products of industry are subject to modification or
qualification in the interests of the society in which they exist. This is
but an instance of the power of the State to set the limits of per-
missible contest open to industrial combatants."
With the exception of the sedition prosecutions,39 no case has been
found that has given to the courts and legislatures the power to pro-
hibit the exercise of civil rights by declaring certain objectives illegal.
If this power is recognized, the issuance of injunctions will depend
in a great part on the fluctuating boundaries of legislative and ju-
dicial policy. If picketing is a form of free speech it should not be
enjoined although employed for an improper purpose.40 If, however,
it is urged that the Thornhill doctrine has been overruled by the
Ritter's Cafe case and its successors, and that peaceful picketing is
38 Carpenters and joiners Union of America, Local 213 et al. v. Ritter's
Cafe et al., 315 U. S. 722, 728, 62 S. Ct. 807, 86 L. Ed. 1143 (1942).
39 Kirchner v. United States, 255 Fed. 301 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 249
U. S. 595, 39 S. Ct. 260, 63 L. Ed. 794 (1918); United States v. Frerichs,
U. S. justice Dept., Interpretation of War Statutes, Bulletin No. 85.
40 CHArE, op. cit. supra note 21, at 14.
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not a constitutionally protected right by incorporation of the First
Amendment into the Fourteenth, then the Supreme Court has ,no
right to interfere with state control of picketing. This dilemma has
yet to be solved by the Court.
Conclusion
Today there is an urgent need for a reformulation of the relation-
ship between the individual and the state, for a modern definition
of civil rights, and for a clarification of the test to determine when
these individual rights must be subordinated to those of society as a
whole. The unfortunate results evoked from the application of the
subjective tests of conspiracy and dangerous tendency under the
Espionage Acts serve as a grim warning to all who fear an encroach-
ment upon personal liberties. A revival of this doctrine is seen today
in the conflict between labor and capital-as illustrated by the Rit-
ter's Cafe, Giboney and Wohl cases.
The constitutional alchemy practiced by the Supreme Court in the
picketing cases has succeeded in producing a hybrid constitutional
right. It is allegedly founded in the Constitution, but depends for
its survival on the will of judges and legislators expressed in policy
declarations, the constitutional justification of which lies within the
broad limits of the reasonable exercise of the police power. The
danger lies in the possibility that other civil liberties will be trodden
in a similar pattern.
It is suggested that the courts and the legislatures refrain from
interfering with constitutional liberties unless a clear and present
danger of substantive evils exists. This test should be applied with
caution and only when extraordinary circumstances warrant. It must
not be confused with public policy.4 1 Of course, criticism of this
test or standard has come from certain judges, 42 but as Antieau has
reminded: 43
Because the formula assumes a constant societal interest in expres-
sion, it is avoided by judges inclined to project their personal values
into the task of delimiting freedom of expression. It is noteworthy that
the worst decisions of the Supreme Court have been those in which it
avoided application of the concept and permitted projection of their own
actions of ideational worth.
41 See United States v. Strong, 263 Fed. 89 (W. D. Wash. 1920).
42 Justice Frankfurter viewed the clear and present danger test as only
a felicitous phrase. See Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 295, 62 S. Ct.
190, 86 L. Ed. 192 (1941) (dissenting opinion).
43 Antieau, "Clear and Present Danger -- Its Meaning and Significance,
25 Norim DAm. LAW. 603, 644 (1950).
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If the Constitution is to retain any real meaning in this era of
fluctuating economic and political philosophies, the recognition and
protection of constitutional liberties must be uniform and objective.
If our American framework of government is to survive, we must be
vigilant in preventing the legislatures and courts from projecting their




CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION OF COPYRIGHTS AND SIMILAR PROPERTY
Not yet delimited but very real is a growing pattern I in the Inter-
nal Revenue Code to subject all income, in the economic or accounting
connotation, to ordinary income tax rates. Adhering to this pattern is
the Revenue Act of 1950,2 which excludes from the definition of
capital assets " .. a copyright; a literary, musical, or artistic com-
position; or similar property . . . " when held by one whose "personal
efforts" created the property, his donee, or the recipient from him in
a tax free exchange,
3
The immediate cause of this so-called loophole elimination were
the two widely publicized transactions occurring in 1948. The first was
the sale by amateur writer, professional soldier Dwight Eisenhower
of his war memoirs, which the Bureau, it was reported, ruled was the
sale of a capital asset.4 Equally startling to the public was the treat-
ment of the sale of the "Amos 'n Andy" radio show by its creators to
the Columbia Broadcasting System for a reputed $2,000,000.5 This
I The beginning of this trend may have had its starting point in the
Revenue Act of 1934, which amended the then inventory exclusion to read:
".. . held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of . . . trade
or business." 48 STAT. 714 (1934). [Emphasis supplied.] This was designed
to make securities held for sale by a floor trader ordinary assets.
Other examples of this pattern are the several short sale amendments
of the past decade, and the collapsible corporation provisions of the 1950 Act.
See Pub. L. No. 814, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. § 212 (Aug. 22, 1950).
2 Pub. L. No. 814, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 22, 1950).
3 Id., § 210(a).
4 J. S. Seidman, Eisenhower Book Sale Illustrates Ordinary-Capital Gain
Taxation, N. Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 3, 1948, as it is quoted and cited in
SuRRE- & WARREN, FamoAL INCOME TAXATioN: CAsEs & MATERIALS 515 (1950);
N. Y. Times, June 2, 1948, p. 31, col. 1; p. 29, col. 5.
5 Kiplinger Tax Letter, Sept. 11, 1948, p. 3.
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program was declared property and a capital asset by another un-
reported Bureau opinion.6 Without embarking upon a detailed analy-
sis 7 of the two transactions, the one element they obviously have in
common is that the value of the property in them was created by the
personal efforts of their owners. The gain from transfers such as these
Congress has found fit to tax at ordinary rates regardless of concepts
of amateur or professional, property or non-property in the classical
sense, or whether or not the property was created in business activity.
The 1950 amendment thus excludes from capital assets--and con-
sequently from the advantageous capital gains rates-copyrights and
similar property when in the hands of their creator, or one in whose
hands "... the basis of such property is determined ...in whole or
in part by reference to the basis of such property in the hands.
of its creator.8 As previously stated, this includes the creator's donee
or the recipient from him (or from his donee) in a tax free exchange.
Does this mean that this genus of property is absolutely eliminated
from being a capital asset? Not absolutely. A purchaser of a copy-
right, or one who receives it by inheritance or bequest can hold the
property as a capital asset. These holders would not be excluded be-
cause the basis of the property in their hands is not computed in whole
or in part by reference to the basis in the hands of its creator.9 Also,
once the property is sold or passes by death, a donee or the recipient
of it in a tax free exchange can hold it as a capital asset. It goes with-
out saying that the other exclusions of section 117(a) (1) apply, and
that a copyright will be precluded from being a capital asset if it is
depreciable property used in the trade or business, 10 or property held
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's trade or
business." So long as copyrights, radio shows, musical compositions,
and similar property are sold, and incidentally inherited or received by
bequest, the problem of capital gains taxation of this property will
continue to exist, though in a much more restricted area than pre-
viously. With this in mind an examination of the capital gains taxa-
tion of copyrights and similar property is in order.
6 Ibid.
7 An exhaustive analysis of the "Amos 'n Andy" transaction appears in
Mintz, Entertainers and the Capital Gains Tax, 4 TAx L. REv. 275 (1949).
See also Fulda, Copyright Assignments and the Capital Gains Tax, 58 YAx
L. J. 245 (1948).
8 INT. REv. CODE §117(a)(1)(C) (ii).
9 The basis for a purchaser is cost. INT. REV. CODE § 113(a). For one
taking by inheritance or bequest it is the fair market value at the time of
acquisition. INT. Rv. COD § 113(a)(5); Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.113(a)(5)-1.
10 INT. REv. CODE §117(a)(1)(B).




The expressed intent 12 of the 1950 amendment was to close the leak
in the dike that permitted income derived from personal efforts of
amateur artists and authors to be taxed at capital gains rates. The
House of Representatives sought to plug the hole completely, for it
included in the original bill not only copyrights and similar property,
but also inventions, patents, and designs.' 3 The Senate rejected the
exclusion of this property stating that it ". . . believes that the desir-
ability of fostering the work of such inventions outweighs the small
amount of revenue which might be obtained .... ,, 14 This legislative
distinction may be more significant than it first appears. Admittedly
it is based upon the collateral policy of encouraging amateur inventors,
but nevertheless, is it not sufficient to at least hint that the basis of
decision in patent and copyright cases is not identical? For the most
part patent decisions have had compelling influence upon the reasoning
of copyright cases. It is suggested that the similarity of these two types
of monopolies in general law should not be carried over unmitigated
into tax law. Of course, the customary analogies drawn from the cases
deciding whether a patent was held primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of the taxpayer-inventor's business will no longer
be applied to determine the same question for amateur writers and
artists.' 5
The 1950 Act brings into focus several problems, of which the most
evident is what is "similar property." From the terms of the Act,
the Congressional reports, and the commonly known purposes for which
the Act was enacted, it is reasonable to list two categories of property
that were meant to be excluded: (1) copyrightable creations; (2) simi-
lar property which, though not copyrightable under the statute, is ac-
corded common law protection. 1 6 These classes are broad enough to
say the least. Do they prescribe the ultimate limits of the property
excluded? It would seem so, for the Senate Finance Committee ex-
pressly rejected any implication that all the fruits of personal efforts
12 SN. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), 1950 U. S. CODE
CONG. SERV. 3097, 3140; CONECENCE REPORT, Pub. L. No. 814, 81st Cong., 2d
Seess. (1950), 1950 U. S. CODE CONG. SFRv. 3230.
13 SEN. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), 1950 U. S. CODE
CONG. SERv. 3097.
14 Id. at 3097-8.
15 An article bringing out these analogies is Casey, Sale of Patents, Copy-
rights and Royalty Interests, 7 N. Y. U. FED. TAx INST. 383 (1949).
16 A good example is the protection afforded trade-marks by the common
law irrespective of trade-mark registration statutes. See 1 Nxns, UNFAIR COm-
PETITION AND TRADE MAREs §§ 36-43 (4th ed. 1947). Also see CAL.mA,
UNFAIR COmPETrITiON, AimxacAN BAR ASSoCIATION GENEaAL PRACTIcE SRIEs
(1946).
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are to be denied capacity to be capital assets. After alluding to a radio
show as being embraced by the exclusionary definition, the Committee
stated: 
17
The interest of a sole proprietor in such a business enterprise as
a photographic studio is not "similar property" even though the value
of the business may be largely attributable to the personal efforts of
the sole proprietor.
Thus goodwill,18 a trade name,19 or the interest in a partnership,20
the value of which arise from personal efforts, are not excluded from
capital asset classification.
It seems that a single test of "personal efforts" is inadequate to
define "similar property." Rather a dual criterion of "personal" and
"artistic" effort has been established. The artistic aspect contains
a negative element which can be described as "non-business." To
elaborate, where the artistic contribution approaches identity with a
business enterprise, the resultant goodwill created is associated more
with the business activity than the personal artistic endeavor. If a par-
ticular activity tends to be a business or commercial activity in the
traditional sense-not merely a money-making enterprise, as a radio
show-the fruit of the personal effort can still be a capital asset. On
the other hand, if the activity is primarily artistic, the fruit of the per-
sonal effort is to be taxed as income. The Committee's example of a
photographic studio points up this distinction excellently. Another
illustration is the business of a wedding director.
Neatly curtailed by the amendment is the procedure by which an
amateur author or composer could transfer his copyright to a newly
created corporation in exchange for its stock, and then sell the stock
at capital gain rates. The Senate report points out 21 that this is pre-
cluded by the concurrently enacted collapsible corporation provisions.
22
Ostensibly unappreciated is the fact that the copyright exclusion also
aids in preventing an avoidance of the spirit of the enactment. Under
the collapsible corporation provisions the author or composer could
transfer his copyright to the newly formed corporation, which in turn
could transfer the copyright and hold the proceeds for the three year
period 23 after which the collapsible corporation provisions are inappli-
17 SEx. RF. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), 1950 U. S. CODE
CONG. SERv. 3140.
18 See e.g., Aaron Michaels, 12 T. C. 17 (1949).
19 See e.g., Rainier Brewing Co., 7 T. C. 162 (1946), aff'd per curiam,
165 F. (2d) 217 (9th Cir. 1948); Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 6 T. C. 856
(1946), affd per curiam, 165 F. (2d) 216 (9th Cir. 1948).
20 Commissioner v. Shapiro, 125 F. (2d) 532 (6th Cir. 1942).
21 SEN. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), 1950 U. S. CODE
CONG. SERv. 3140-1.
22 Pub. L. No. 814, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., § 212 (Aug. 22, 1950); INT. REV.
CODE § 117(m).
23 INT. R v. CODE § 117(m)(3)(C).
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cable. But under the copyright exclusion the copyright would remain
an ordinary asset, because the corporation, being a recipient of it in
a tax free exchange, would hold the copyright with the same basis as
the author or composer. Thus, the seller of the copyright could not
avoid taxation at ordinary rates. This double barrelled sanction makes
virtually any transfer to a dummy corporation result in a tax loss;
the copyright cannot be converted to a capital asset by the transfer,
and the proceeds of a subsequent assignment are subject to the added
corporation tax.
A concurrent amendment 24 to section 117(j) eliminates the possi-
bility that a copyright could be construed to be a 117(j) asset if used
in the business and held over six months.2 5
The question has been posed whether a contract for contingent pay-
ment received for the sale of a copyright can be a capital asset. If
a composer, for instance, sold his copyright receiving a contract for
payment according to the volume of sales of sheet music, and he in
turn sold this contract after substantial amounts had accrued on it,
would the sale of the contract be of a capital asset? It has been sug-
gested that it would.26 The doctrine of Herman M. Rhodes 27 appears
to this writer to prevent such a circumvention. That case, following
the reasoning of Helvering v. Horst,28 held that the right to receive
declared dividends was not a capital asset; although it might be pro-
perty, it predominantly was simply the right to receive income.
Despite the thorough closing of the pre-1950 loophole the ultimate
ramifications of the spirit of the law can still be circumvented. For
example, although a donee of the copyright takes it as an ordinary
assset, the gift can appreciably reduce tax liability. This will occur if
the income of the donee is substantially less than that of the donor.
24 Pub. L. No. 814, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. § 210(b) (Aug. 22, 1950); INT
REv. CODE § 117(j)(1)(C).
25 See SEN. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), 1950 U. S. CODE
CONG. SEav. 3140.
26 The royalty contract was likened to a lease, which if not used in the
trade or business, can be a capital asset. See Walter H. Sutliff, 46 B. T. A.
446 (1942). This idea appears in Casey, supra note 15, at 385.
27 43 B. T. A. 780, 784 (1941), aff'd per curiam, 131 F. (2d) 50 (6th
Cir. 1942), in which the court said: ". . . the exercise of his power to sell or
assign his right to receive the declared dividend constituted a realization of
income by petitioner taxable to him as ordinary income." This case is followed
by E. Blakeney Gleason, P-H 1942 BTA MEwm. Dxc. 142,572 (1942); Leslie
M. Stratton, P-H 1942 BTA MEM. DEc. f 42,331 (1942). Also see Fred W.
Warner, 5 B. T. A. 963 (1926).
28 311 U. S. 112, 118, 61 S. Ct. 144, 85 L. Ed. 75 (1940), in which the
Court considering section 22(a) stated: "The power to dispose of income
is the equivalent of ownership of it. The exercise of that power to procure
the payment of income to another is the enjoyment, and hence the realization,
of the income by him who exercises it."
NOTES
Under the rule of Blair v. Commissioner 2 9 there must be an actual
and complete transfer of the property itself; an assignment of income
will not do. This would require an assignment, under the indivisible
rights theory to be subsequently discussed, of all the rights of the copy-
right.
II.
Copyrights as Capital Assets
As has been seen, only a purchaser, or one who receives by inher-
itance or bequest, or their transferees can hold a copyright as a capital
asset. Even then the asset is subject to the other exclusions of section
117(a) (1). The cases concerning these exclusions as they operated on
copyrights before the 1950 Act are still of general applicability, but
the emphasis on the principles contained in them must be completely
shifted. For example, prior to the amendment, the question often was
whether the author or composer was a professional, i.e., did he hoIdfig
copyright primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his
business, 30 or did he use the copyright, subject to depreciation, in his
trade or business. 31 This occasioned an investigation of prior sales of
similar property by the taxpayer,3 2 how he characterized himself on
income tax returns and other formal papers,3 3 and whether he con-
ducted his activities in such a manner as to indicate that he was in the
business of exploiting his creative talents. 34 As he can no longer hold
a copyright as a capital asset, these tests do not apply to the taxpayer-
artist. Except for the fact of previous sales, they seldom will be ap-
plied to his purchaser, or one receiving by inheritance or bequest, be-
cause usually these persons will not also be creative artists. The prob-
lem will be to determine whether a purchaser-who subsequently sells
and asserts that he sold a capital asset-is in the business of dealing
in copyrights. To decide this, resort to the reasoning of the real estate
dealer cases will be most appropriate, because the frequencies of sales
of real property and copyrights are near enough to render these cases
29 300 U. S. 5, 57 S. Ct. 330, 81 L. Ed. 465 (1937).
30 Goldsmith et al. v. Commissioner, 143 F. (2d) 466 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U. S. 774, 65 S. Ct. 135, 89 L. Ed. 619 (1944); Joseph A. Fields,
14 T. C. 1202, P-H 1950 TC SERv. ff 14.136 (1950).
31 This question is brought up in Joseph A. Fields, supra note 30, but is
not decided.
32 Goldsmith et al. v. Commissioner, 143 F. (2d) 446 (2d Ci.), cert.
denied, 323 U. S. 774, 65 S. Ct. 135, 89 L. Ed. 619 (1944); see Joseph A.
Fields, supra note 30.
33 See note 30 supra. Characterizing oneself as a playright, author, in-
ventor, and the like .has had a remarkable conclusiveness upon the courts in
deciding that the taxpayer was dealing in ordinary assets.
34 Goldsmith et al. v. Commissioner, 143 F. (2d) 446 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U. S. 774, 65 S. Ct. 135, 89 L. Ed. 619 (1944). Also see Herman
Shumlin, 16 T. C. No. 51, P-H 1951 TC SERv. ff 16.51 (1951).
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suitable for comparison. 35 Again the axiom must be repeated that
every case necessarily is to be decided primarily upon its particular
facts.
36
The purchaser of a copyright will be also confronted with the ex-
clusion of depreciable property used in the trade or business. If he
exploits the intangible he will be using it in his trade or business.
There is no dispute that the property would be subject to deprecia-
tion. 37 If he does not actively exploit it, he will have to sell it in
order to recoup his investment. Very few sales would be consum-
mated before copyrights held by him would be deemed to be held
primarily for sale. Possibly he could lease or assign partial rights
in the copyrights without establishing himself as holding the property
for sale.38 Then a single sale might not be held to be the disposal
of property held primarily for sale. From all this it appears that
only in the very rare case can a purchaser hold a copyright as a capi-
tal asset.
Admittedly it also will be unusual for one to inherit or receive by
bequest a valuable copyright free from restrictions imposed upon its
use or transfer. When it does occur, the recipient can sell it and
assert with success that the asset is capital, unless he commences
to enter into a systematic attempt to sell the property in a manner
approximating a business venture, 39 or proceeds to exploit it in an
actual business. If he simply sells it he most probably will be dis-
posing of a capital asset.
40
A copyright, then, can still be a capital asset, but it will be such
only infrequently. The principal incidence will occur when the prop-
erty is received by reason of the death of the owner.
35 See Allison, When and How to Be a Dealer Rather Than an Investor
for Tax Purposes, 86 JOUR. op AccouNTrA~cy 38 (1948); Clark, Distinguishing
Between Dealer and Investor Sales by the Same Taxpayer, 8 N. Y. U. FED.
TAX INST. 855 (1950); Marks, Buying and Selling Real Estate, 5 N. Y. U.
FED. TAX INST. 416 (1947).
36 "To determine whether the activities of a taxpayer are 'carrying on
a business' requires an examination of the facts of each case." Higgins v.
Commissioner, 312 U. S. 212, 217, 61 S. Ct. 475, 85 L. Ed. 783 (1941).
37 Associated Patentees, 4 T. C. 979 (1945); International Textbook Co.
v. United States, 44 F. (2d) 254 (Ct. Cl. 1930).
38 In Lester P. Barlow, P-H 1943 TC MERE. DEc. fT 43,237 (1943), an
inventor who had previously leased and licensed patents was found not to be
holding the patents primarily for sale to customers.
39 The Commissioner failed to prove that the activities of the taxpayer
amounted to a business enterprise in R. Foster Reynolds, P-H 1945 TC MEE.
DEc. 1145,276 (1945), aff'd, 159 F. (2d) 620 (1st Cir. 1946), in which the
property was jewelry received by bequest.
40 Minerva King Patch, P-H 1941 BTA ME. Dc. 1141,552 (1941). In
this case a rancher received cattle by a residuary legacy. He did not wish to
keep these animals with his herd, so he sold them in bulk. It was held that




Sales or Exchanges of Copyrights
Coordinate with the requirement that property be a capital asset
is that it must be sold or exchanged in order that a capital trans-
action occur. Whether a sale has taken place is the most perplexing
question in capital gains taxation of copyrights.
Settling conflicting holdings of the second 4' and fourth 42 Circuit
Courts of Appeal, the Supreme Court in 1949 held in Wodehouse v.
Commissioner 43 that ". . . lump sum payments made in advance
for limited rights under copyrights . . ." were royalties within the
meaning of section 211(a), taxable as gross income of a nonresident
alien. Without discussion, but alluding to two previous circuit court
decisions,4 4 the Court found that there had not been any sale of
a capital asset, but only a license. The license consisted of the assign-
ment by the author of all the rights in several stories to publishing
companies under an agreement that the publishers would procure
copyrights and then reassign all rights to the author except the ex-
clusive serial rights for the United States, Canada, and South Amer-
ica.45 Assuming that the Court believed the arrangement to be an
exclusive licensing of the serial rights, it impliedly sanctioned the
"indivisible right" or "bundle of rights" theory.4 6
Before continuing it should be emphasized that the decision of
the Court concerned sections 211(a) and 143(b), and not 117(a) (1).
The first two deal with the taxation of gross income of nonresident
aliens, and they exclude from gross income proceeds from capital
transactions. They are founded in view of, and in addition to, the
established concepts of the Code.47 Therefore, the concept of capital
assets within their provisions should be identical to that of section
117(a)(1). It is with this understanding that the Wodehouse and
other cases will be discussed. More will be said of this problem later.
41 Rohmer et ux. v. Commissioner, 153 F. (2d) 61 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
328 U. S. 862, 66 S. Ct. 1367, 90 L. Ed. 1632 (1946).
42 Wodehouse v. Commissioner, 166 F. (2d) 986 (4th Cir. 1948), reversed,
337 U. S. 369, 69 S. Ct. 1120, 93 L. Ed. 1419 (1949).
43 337 U. S. 369, 392, 69 S. Ct. 1120, 93 L. Ed. 1419 (1949).
44 Rohmer et ux. v. Commissioner, 153 F. (2d) 61 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
328 U. S. 862, 66 S. Ct. 1367, 90 L. Ed. 1632 (1946); Sabatini v. Commis-
sioner, 98 F. (2d) 753 (2d Cir. 1938).
45 8 T. C. 637, 649 (1947).
46 See generally Fulda, supra note 7; Fincke, An Analysis of the Income
Aspects of Patents, Copyrights, and Their Analogues, 5 TAX L. Rav. 361, 371
(1950).
47 See Wodehouse v. Commissioner, 337 U. S. 369, 401, 418 et seq., 69
S. Ct. 1120, 93 L. Ed. 1419 (1949) (dissenting opinion); Wodehouse v. Com-
missioner, 166 F. (2d) 986, 989 (4th Cir. 1948); Fulda, supra note 7, at 263
et seq.
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The indivisible rights theory has variations,48 but the theme of
each is that a copyright is an indivisible aggregate of rights.4 9 Unless
all the rights are transferred no sale of property has been effected,
only a license given.
The source of this theory is twofold. One is evolution from de-
cisions in infringement suits in general copyright law concerning
partial assignments. Possibly the clearest expression of the doctrine
is in Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co.,5 0 an infringement
suit. A copyright in a composition of Victor Herbert was owned by
the plaintiff who had made an assignment of the exclusive right of
public performance for profit. The plaintiff was allowed to maintain
his suit against the infringer of the assignee's exclusive right on the
grounds that the copyright was an indivisible thing which cannot be
assigned as to rights ". . . less than the sum of all [the] rights com-
prehended in the copyright." The decision is solidly supported by
earlier authority, 51 but like these prior cases, it involved a procedural
problem-who may sue for infringement. In fact, all the cases that
have been discoverd which ascribe to the indivisible rights theory
deal with procedural questions.52 Thus, a rule which was designed
to remedy adjective difficulties has been transposed to decide sub-
stantive questions of a totally alien nature. To complete the picture
it must be remarked that even in the procedural cases, there is author-
ity rejecting the doctrine. 53
The second source of the theory has been from analogy to the
patent decisions. As early as 1850, the Supreme Court declared that
a patent monopoly was entire; that it granted the three exclusive
rights of making, using, and selling; that the assignment of anything
less than all three (for a geographical area) was only a license.
54
48 The principal variation is the "substantiality" doctrine promulgated in
Rohmer et ux. v. Commissioner, 153 F. (2d) 61, 64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
328 U. S. 862, 66 S. Ct. 1367, 90 L. Ed. 1632 (1946). See text at note 68 infra.
49 Sabatini v. Commissioner, 98 F. (2d) 753 (2d Cir. 1938).
50 298 Fed. 470 (E. D. S. C. 1924), aff'd per curiam, 2 F. (2d) 1020 (4th
Cir. 1924).
51 See e.g., Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Howells Sales Co., 282 Fed. 9 (2d
Cir. 1922); New Fiction Publishing Co. v. Star Co., 220 Fed. 994 (S. D. N. Y.
1915).
52 Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., supra note 50; Goldwyn
Pictures Corp. v. Howells Sales Co., supra note 51; New Fiction Publishing Co.
v. Star Co., supra note 51; Empire City Amusement Co. v. Wilton, 134 Fed.
132 (C. C. D. Mass. 1903); Black v. Henry G. Allen Co., 42 Fed. 618 (C.C. S.D. N.
Y. 1890); Keene v. Wheatley, 14 Fed. Cas. 180, No. 7, 644 (C.C. E.D. Pa.).
53 Roberts v. Myers, 20 Fed. Cas. 898, No. 11,906 (C.C. D.Mass. 1860); a
copyright is divisible to the extent that separate rights are recognized by the copy-
right statute, Public Ledger Co. v. New York Times, 275 Fed. 562 (S.D. N.Y.
1921), aff'd 279 Fed. 747 (2d Cir. 1922); Fitch v. Young, 230 Fed. 743 (S.D. N.Y.
1911); Ford v. Charles E. Blaney Amusement Co., 148 Fed. 642 (C.C. S.D. N.Y.
1906).
54 Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477, 494, 495, 13 L. Ed. 504 (U. S. 1850).
NOTES
This has been reasserted by the Court,55 and adopted by the patent
statute.56 It has been accepted without hesitation by the courts in
patent tax cases. 57 Then, as is universally done, the likeness of copy-
rights to patents was announced, and the rule similarly applied, with-
out evaluation, to the copyright tax litigations.
58
Originally the Bureau did not adhere to the indivisible rights
theory,59 but in 1933 it reversed its position." °
Two distinct factual situations are contained in the cases. One
involves the problem whether there has been a sale within the mean-
ing of section 117, the capital gains provisions. The other is whether
the assignment is a sale of property (amounting to a capital asset),
or is only a license giving rise to ordinary income in the form of
royalties within the comprehension of sections 211(a) and 143(b),
which deal with the taxation of gross income of non-resident aliens.
Although the second circuit court has stated that the reasoning ap-
plicable to section 117 is not apropos to section 211(a),61 as pre-
viously stated 62 there is no sound conceptual basis for this dis-
tinction. The underlying issues are identical-the concepts of "capi-
tal asset" and "sale." Only after these preliminary matters have
been disposed of do the differences arise. Then, if it is found that
a particular receipt has been from a capital transaction, as custom-
arily conceived by the Code, the gain is excluded from the gross
income of the nonresident alien recipient. Finally, it must be noted
that most of the cases 63 do not recognize the distinction in citations
of controlling authority, and Justice Frankfurter in his dissent 64 in
the Wodehouse case expressly rejected it.
Sabatini v. Commissioner 65 was the first tax decision adopting
the indivisible rights theory. Here a nonresident alien granted the
exclusive right for ten years to produce motion pictures from several
55 Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U. S. 252, 11 S. Ct. 334, 34 L. Ed. 923
(1891).
56 35 U. S. C. §40 (1946).
57 See e.g., Parke Davis & Co., 31 B. T. A. 427 (1934).
58 See Sabatini v. Commissioner, 98 F. (2d) 753 (2d Cir. 1938).
59 0. D. 998, 5 Cum. BuuL. 117 (1921).
60 I. T. 2735, XII-2 Cum. BULL. 131, 135 (1933).
61 Rohmer et ux. v. Commissioner, 153 F. (2d) 61, 65 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 328 U. S. 862, 66 S. Ct. 1367, 90 L. Ed. 1632 (1946).
62 See text at note 47 supra.
63 Irving Berlin, 42 B. T. A. 668 (1940), involving section 117, expressly
follows the Sabatini decision without distinction. Neither do the cases follow-
ing the Berlin case mention any difference between the two sections. See Her-
man Shumlin, 16 T. C. No. 51, P-H 1951 TC SERv. ff 16.51 (1951); Joseph
A. Fields, 14 T. C. 1202, P-H 1950 TC SEr. fT 14.136 (1950).
64 337 U. S. 369, 401 passim, 69 S. Ct. 1120, 93 L. Ed. 1419 (1949).
65 98 F. (2d) 753 (2d Cir. 1938).
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of his novels. In reversing the Board of Tax Appeals, 6 the court
declared that there had not been a sale (in England exempt from
American taxation, as found by the Board), but only a license to
use the property. The rationale was that partial rights in a copy-
right could not be sold; they only could be licensed. However, the
Court did not rely on the copyright decisions; in fact it cited only
one case in which the issue was whether a sale of cotton to the Con-
federacy passed title.
6 7
Prior to the Wodehouse decision, the other leading case was Rok-
mer v. Commissioner, in which the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in a nonresident alien litigation, stated the rule:
6
8
Where a copyright owner transfers to any particular transferee
substantially less than the entire "bundle of rights" conferred by the
copyright, then payment therefore, whether in one sum or in several
payments, constitutes royalties within the meaning of § 211(a) (1) (A).
For such a transfer is the grant of a license. [Emphasis supplied.]
Here the court enunciated the substantiality test, a variation of the
indivisible rights doctrine. This variation was forced upon the court
as it was confronted by two patent cases 69 in which not all of the
rights had been transferred, but nevertheless in which it was held
that the patents had been sold and not merely licensed. By foot-
note the court warns that what is "substantial" must be decided on
a case-to-case basis.
7 0
The Sabatini rule has been extended, without a reappraisal of its
validity, to be applicable to a perpetual license rather than a limited
term as in the Sabatini case; 71 to situations involving section 117
directly; 72 to assignments of not just one right, but several, although
not all; 73 and to partial assignments coupled with a bailment of lim-
ited duration.7 4
Only one case has re-evaluated the Sabatini doctrine. The fourth
circuit court, in Wodehouse v. Commissioner,75 cogently pointed out
that the theory of the Sabatini case was untenable on at least three
grounds. Primary among these was that it did not take into account
66 32 B. T. A. 705 (1935).
67 That was Whitfield v. United States, 92 U. S. 165, 23 L. Ed. 705 (1876).
68 153 F. (2d) 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1946).
69 Commissioner v. Celanese Corp. of America, 140 F. (2d) 339 (D. C.
Cir. 1944); General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Commissioner, 139 F. (2d) 759
(2d Cir. 1944).
70 153 F. (2d) 61, 64 n.15 (2d Cir. 1946).
71 Rohmer et ux. v. Commissioner, 153 F. (2d) 61, 63 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 328 U. S. 862, 66 S. Ct. 1367, 90 L. Ed. 1632 (1947).
72 Irving Berlin, 42 B. T. A. 668 (1940).
73 Sax Rohmer, 14 T. C. 1467, P-H 1950 TC Sxav. 11 14.171 (1950).
74 Ehrlich v. Higgins, 52 F. Supp. 805 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
75 166 F. (2d) 986 (4th Cir. 1948), reversing, 8 T. C. 637 (1947), reV'd
337 U. S. 369, 69 S. Ct. 1120, 93 L. Ed. 1419 (1949).
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the realities of the "literary market," where copyright rights are sold
separately as independent property rights. The court traced the
authority for the indivisible theory showing that it arose from pro-
cedural requirements, but that even these requirements in their
proper setting were not demanding enough to compel a unanimous
acceptance of the doctrine.76 Furthermore, the court added that the
very foundation of the theory-the inability of the assignee to sue
for infringement of his right-has been swept away in both patent 
77
and copyright cases. 78 The court concluded that what amounted to
a sale of exclusive serial rights was a sale of a capital asset. Unfor-
tunately a majority of the Supreme Court saw differently, and re-
versed the circuit court in this case.
7 9
Reluctance to accept the doctrine has appeared elsewhere. In
Goldsmith v. Commissioner 8 0 Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the
majority in dictum, believed that an exclusive license of one of the
. . . various kinds of reproductions . . . of a copyright is for most
purposes treated as "property." I think that it is "property" within
§ 117(a) (1); that its grant is a "sale." ...
It does not unduly strain the meaning of "sale" to make it include
an exclusive license ...
In the Wodehouse case the Supreme Court carefully sidestepped
the essence of the controversy by substantially confining itself to the
issue of whether the nonresident alien had received income within
the meaning of section 211 (a) (1) (A) under the 1936 Act. It assumed
that the assignment was not a sale, but did not discuss the ques-
tion, contenting itself with citations to the Sabatini and Rohmer
cases. Justice Frankfurter, joined by two other justices, dissented,
81
assailing the opinion of the majority with all of the previously out-
lined arguments. He commented that the majority had failed to
decide the essential point in issue-whether there had been a sale.
Although one cannot be absolutely sure, this decision, citing with
approval the Sabatini and Rohmer cases, has apparently conclusively
determined that a copyright is not sold unless all of its rights are
assigned. This adherence to the indivisible rights theory is unwar-
ranted on several grounds. It is a procedural rule that has been
76 See note 53 supra.
77 Independent Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 269 U. S.
459, 46 S. Ct. 166, 70 L. Ed. 357 (1926).
78 L. C. Page & Co. v. Fox Film Corp., 83 F. (2d) 196 (2d Cir. 1936);
Stephens v. Howells Sales Co. 16 F. (2d) 805 (S.D. N.Y. 1926); FED. R.
Civ. P. 19(a).
79 337 U. S. 369, 69 S. Ct. 1120, 93 L. Ed. 1419 (1949).
80 143 F. (2d) 466, 467, 468 (2d Cir. 1944), affirming on different
grounds, 1 T. C. 711 (1943), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 774, 65 S. Ct. 135, 89
L. Ed. 619 (1944).
81 337 U. S. 369, 401, 69 S. Ct. 1120, 93 L. Ed. 1419 (1949).
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injected into unrelated substantive matters. Even as a procedural
rule it was subject to objection, was not universally accepted, 82 and
has been fundamentally upset by another decision of the Supreme
Court.83 But primarily it is objectionable because it controverts
business reality. 84 It is universal practice to assign specific rights
under a copyright. These are bought and sold as property by those
frequenting the marketplace. If taxation is to serve its proper role
in the economic system, with a minimum of friction, it must operate
according to the established practices of the business world.85
A far better test would be the "economic interest" criterion applied
in the mineral lease cases.8 6 In these cases a capital asset is equated
with an economic interest of a durable nature, regardless of the form
the interest takes in the mineral. A test such as this would lead to
uniformity and greater predictability in copyright "sale" litigations,
and would make them compatible with the rationale of other capital
asset decisions.
87
The "sale" question will arise much less frequently in the future
since the ambit of copyrights as capital assets has been drastically
limited by the 1950 Act. It will continue to arise in nonresident alien
cases if the courts accept the statement in the Rohmer case that sec-
tion 211(a) is distinct from section 117(a).88 Even if this fallacious
assumption is accepted, litigation will be more sparse--disregarding
the fact that the Supreme Court has spoken-because the 1950 Act





The 1950 copyright and similar property exclusion has made it
impossible for the creator of this type of property to hold it as a
capital assset; neither can his donee or the recipient of it from him
82 See note 53 supra.
83 Independent Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 269 U. S.
459, 46 S. Ct. 166, 70 L. Ed. 357 (1926).
84 See note 47 sura.
85 See a statement of principle to this effect in Helvering v. Hallock, 309
U. S. 106, 116-8, 60 S. Ct. 444, 84 L. Ed. 604 (1940).
86 See e.g., Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U. S. 25, 29, 35,
66 S. Ct. 861, 90 L. Ed. 1062 (1946).
87 Among these are Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F. (2d) 450 (10th Cir. 1950)
(an exclusive territorial insurance agency held to be a capital asset); Elliot B.
Smoak, 43 B. T. A. 907 (1941) (an exclusive license to sell milk vending ma-
chines in a restricted territory held to be a capital asset); I. T. 3873, 1947-2
Cum. BULL. 82 (a liquor license held to be a capital asset).
88 See note 61 supra.
89 Pub. L. No. 814, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. § 213 (Aug. 22, 1950); INT. R v.
CODE § 211(a) (1) (B).
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(or his donee) in a tax free exchange so hold it. The operation of
the other exclusions of section 117 makes it practically impossible for
a purchaser to hold it other than as an ordinary asset. Generally
it can be said that the only one who receives this type of property
as the result of the death of the previous owner can obtain capital
asset advantages.
One question remains. Does the "personal" and "artistic" effort
qualifications apply to tangible property such as paintings or statues?
Usually these either will be found to be held for sale to customers,
or the hired artist will be deemed to be rendering personal services.
Even though the work is a casual effort by an amateur, it is per-
sonal and artistic, and is not of the nature of a business enterprise.90
Clearly it is within the scope of the exclusion.
Subject to the status of the holder of the asset, what is excluded
from the capital asset definition by the 1950 amendment is any
property, tangible or intangible, copyrightable or non-copyrightable,
which is created by the personal efforts of the taxpayer, is predom-
inantly artistic, and is not an element of a business enterprise in any
substantial way. All of these elements must exist for the property
to be excluded. When the copyright itself is not a capital asset, neither
is a contract for contingent royalty payments arising from its sale.
In evaluating the present law, the 1950 Act certainly has imposed
income rates upon a significant portion of what is income in the eco-
nomic and accounting connotation. Assuming equitable taxation to
be the object of the Code, 9 ' the amendment is a worthwhile and
effective addition to the Code.
Mark Harry Berens
Torts
LIABILITY OF THE DRUGLESS HEALER FOR MALPRACTICE
While the art of healing may be subdivided and analyzed in many
ways, the law recognizes, for the purpose of malpractice liability, the
classification based upon the use or nonuse of drugs, medicine and
surgery. Those utilizing these means of cure are termed physicians and
surgeons, and are qualified to practice in the general field of medicine.
All others engaged in the art of healing are classified as drugless healers,
who may or may not belong to a recognized school.
Numerous controversies have arisen with the healing professions as
to the best methods and cures to utilize. The rivalry which exists today
90 See text at and following note 17 supra.
91 See generally, Peters, Tax Law and Natural Law, 26 NoTRE DAm LAW.
29 (1950).
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between regular physicians and the chiropractor, the osteopath, the
naturopath, the Christian Science healer, and the clairvoyant physician
is but a repetition of the rivalty between the allopath and the homeo-
path, the physio-medic, the eclectic, and the botanic physician of 175
years ago. It is still more symbolic of the competition during earlier
centuries between the physician and the apothecary, and the surgeon
and the barber.1
The fact that many healing methods do not prove successful led to
early recognition by the law of the doctrine of malpractice. At com-
mon law, any person was at liberty to practice medicine, subject only
to the civil responsibilities that grew out of his relation to those whom
he treated. 2 He was bound to discharge his duties with the learning,
skill and diligence usually possessed and exercised by physicians sim-
ilarly situated.3 Thus, the door of the profession was open to all,
but those who entered could not escape the common law responsibility
for their acts.
4
It soon became apparent that the protection afforded the public by
the common law was inadequate. The states, therefore, in the exercise
of their police power to preserve and protect the public health, legis-
lated to regulate and control the practice of medicine.5 Today this
includes supervision of the related sciences as well, for the power of a
state to regulate the special branches of the art, apart from the general
practice of medicine, is beyond question. 6
The statutes, however, have followed the common law.7 Every
physician has been made answerable for injury to his patient resulting
from want of requisite knowledge and skill, from omission of reasonable
care and diligence, or from failure to exercise his best judgment.8 The
doctrine of malpractice has been applied by the courts not only to reg-
ularly licensed physicians and surgeons, but also to all others who hold
themselves out professionally as being able to treat the human body
and cure disease.9
What shall here be attempted is to determine the civil (and inci-
dentally, criminal) liability of drugless healers for malpractice. The
general principles that apply to these practitioners in malpractice ac-
1 See Caldwell, Early Legislation Regulating the Practice of Medicine, 18 ILL.
L. REv. 225 (1923).
2 State et al. v. Borah, 51 Ariz. 318, 76 P. (2d) 757 (1938).
3 Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 40 N. W. 228 (1888).
4 State et al. v. Borah, 51 Ariz. 318, 76 P. (2d) 757 (1938).
5 State ex rel. Burroughs v. Webster, 150 Ind. 607, 50 N. E. 750 (1898). See
Hutchins, Characteristics and Constitutionality of Medical Legislation, 7 MICH.
L. REv. 295 (1909).
6 Baker v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. Rep. 521, 240 S. W. 924 (1921).
7 Delahunt v. Finton, 244 Mich. 226, 221 N. W. 168 (1928).
8 Mangiameli v. Ariano, 126 Neb. 629, 253 N. W. 871 (1934).
9 Jacob Musser's Executor v. Melvina Chase, 29 Ohio St. 577 (1876).
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tions are determined by their status of belonging or not belonging to a




The special or limited schools of healing, and the practitioners of
these schools, are usually defined both by court decisions and statutes
in terms of the methods, media, or instrumentalities used by them to
accomplish the relief and cure of patients.10 Within the classification of
recognized schools of drugless healing are chiropractic,'" osteopathy,
1 2
chiropody,' 3 optometry, 14 naturopathy,15 and Christian Science.' 6
The principles of law which govern the relation of a regular phy-
sician to his patient also govern the relation of the drugless healer of
a recognized school to his patient.lr He is bound to exercise the reas-
onable skill and care possessed and exercised by others of his school in
the same community or area. 18 - He must have knowledge of the ad-
vanced learning of the school, and of the latest methods of treatment
at the time the treatment is renderd.19 The correctness of the treat-
ment and the professional skill employed are to be tested by the prin-
ciples and practices of his school, and not by those of other schools.
2 0
A person professing to follow one system of healing cannot be expected
10 McNaughton v. Johnson et al., 242 U. S. 344, 37 S. Ct. 178, 61 L. Ed.
352 (1917); People v. Love, 298 Ill. 304, 131 N. E. 809 (1921); Keiningham v.
Blake, 135 Md. 320, 109 AtI. 65 (1919).
11 See Spears Free Clinic & Hospital for Poor Children v. State Board of
Health et al.. .... Colo ...... 220 P. (2d) 872 (1950).
12 Osteopathy was founded in 1874 by Andrew T. Still, who theorized that
disease was caused by physiological discord and deviation from the normal-a
structural maladjustment that could be cured by manipulation-and by impeded
circulation of the blood. BooTr, HISTORY OF OSTEOPATnyr AND TWENTIET CEN-
TuRY MEDicAL PRAcTcE 398-9 (1924). See State v. MacKnight, 131 N. C. 717,
42 S. E. 580 (1902); Comment, Physicians and Surgeons-Status of Osteopaths-
Limitations on Practice, 47 MicH. L. Rav. 565 (1949).
13 See State v. Armstrong, 38 Idaho 493, 225 Pac. 491 (1924).
14 See Kahn v. Shaw, 65 Ga. App. 563, 16 S. E. (2d) 99 (1941); New Jer-
sey State Board of Optometrists v. S. S. Kresge Co., 113 N. J. L. 287, 174 AtI.
353 (S. Ct. 1934).
15 Naturopathy traces its lineage to German healers of the last century who
believed that nature and natural agents--sunlight, water, air, etc.-were the
greatest and most effective healing agents. REal), T E HExANG CULs 63 (1932).
16 See Spead v. Tomlinson, 73 N. H. 46, 59 AtI. 376 (1904).
17 Mitchell v. Atkins, 36 Del. 451, 178 Atl. 593 (Super. Ct. 1935); Treptau
et al. v. Behrens Spa Inc., 247 Wis. 438, 20 N. W. (2d) 108 (1945).
18 Kuechler v. Volgmann, 180 Wis. 238, 192 N. W. 1015 (1923).
19 State v. Smith, 25 Idaho 541, 138 Pac. 1107 (1914).
20 Simms v. Gafney, .... Tex ..... , 227 S. W. (2d) 848 (1950); Wilkins v.
Brock et al., 81 Vt. 332, 70 AtI. 572 (1908). See also Bowles et al. v. Bourbon et
al., 147 Tex. 608, 219 S. W. (2d) 799 (1949).
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by his patient to practice any other. He is not negligent because a
member of another school, including a licensed physician or surgeon,
would have used a different-and possibly more effective-method of
treatment.21 The limited practitioner is not an insurer, nor does he
warrant favorable results. 22 If he possesses ordinary skill, used ordi-
nary care, and utilizes his reasonable judgment, he is not liable even
for mistakes in judgment.2 3 Of course, he can be held liable, under
the doctrine of respondeat superior, for the negligence of an assistant,
when the assistant is under his control and is acting within the scope of
authority.
2 4
If a drugless physician knows, or reasonably should know, that the
treatment that he employs will be of no benefit to the patient, he is
under a duty to so advise the patient. Similarly, should there be an-
other mode of treatment that is more likely to be successful, he has
a duty to send the patient to the appropriate doctor. Failure to do
so when the situation calls for it renders the healer liable for malprac-
tice.25 As malpractice may consist of a lack of skill or care in diagno-
sis, as well as in treatment, 26 it is apparent that if the disease is one that
reasonably should be detected by a skillful healer, he may be liable for
a breach of the duty to detect the disease and advise the patient to
seek the proper medical or surgical treatment.
27
In a malpractice action the burden of proof is on the patient to
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the drugless phy-
sician has not exercised the requisite care and skill.28 The proof must
also establish, as in every negligence action, the causal connection be-
tween the negligence and the injury. In this regard there must be a
showing of more than a possibility of causal connection. 29 It has been
held that the drugless healer is not answerable for any inconvenience,
pain, suffering, or other damages that proximately resulted from the
initial injury, unless he has aggravated it by improper treatment.30
Although proof of negligence properly may be inferred from the
facts of a particular case, 31 the general rule is that the doctrine of res
21 Hilgedorf v. Bertschinger, 132 Ore. 641, 285 Pac. 819 (1930).
22 Josselyn v. Dearborn et al.. .... Me ..... 62 A. (2d) 174 (1948).
23 Ibid.
24 Olsen et al. v. McAtee, 181 Ore. 503, 182 P. (2d) 979 (1947).
25 Carney et ux. v. Lydon et ux. .... Wash ..... 220 P. (2d) 894 (1950).
26 Cook v. Moats, 121 Neb. 769, 238 N. W. 529 (1931).
27 Hampton v. Brackin's jewelry & Optical Co., 237 Ala. 212, 186 So. 173
(1939).
28 Williams v. Marini, 105 Vt. 11, 162 Atl. 796 (1932).
29 Simms v. Gafney .... Tex ..... 227 S. W. (2d) 848 (1950). See Annotation,
Proximate Cause in Malpractice Cases, 13 A. L. R. (2d) 11, 144 (1950).
30 Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P. (2d) 654 (1937). But see
Brooks v. Herd, 144 Wash. 173, 257 Pac. 238 (1927).
31 Janssen v. Mulder, 232 Mich. 183, 205 N. W. 159 (1925).
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ipsa loquitur does not apply to malpractice actions. 32 The reason as-
signed is that to apply the doctrine would do away with the necessity
of expert testimony which is required to fully explain the cause of the
injury, and thus adequately determine whether there is legal respon-
sibility.33 However, at least one court has held that the fact of the
accident itself can be sufficient evidence to support a recovery in the
absence of any explanation by the defendant tending to show that the
injury was not due to his want of care.3 4 In considering the evidence
necessary to prove negligence in malpractice actions, the rule has been
declared that ".... the care required must be in proportion to the dan-
ger to be avoided and the consequence that might reasonably be an-
ticipated." 35
Negligence in failing to take due care to avoid injury to the undis-
eased parts of the patient's body may be proved without resort to expert
testimony.3 6 The ready explanation for this rule is that the injury to
the parts not being treated is not caused by medical treatment; con-
sequently expert testimony is not needed.
The defendant in a malpractice action is entitled to the testimony
of competent practitioners of his own school as to the theories of that
school, and of his conformity to them in his treatment of the patient.3 7
This rule does not exclude the testimony of physicians of another school
where the principles of the schools do or should concur.38 This quali-
fication has been most frequently applied to cases dealing with im-
proper diagnosis.39
A variation of the rule is recognized by the California courts, which
do not preclude a physician in one school from testifying as to the treat-
ment rendered by a practitioner of another school, on matters of com-
mon observation within the experience of every physician and surgeon.
40
32 See e.g., Ewing et al. v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442 (C.C. S.D. Ohio 1897);
SHuAwr, REs IPSA LOQUITOR, PRESUmpTIONs AND BuRDEN OP PROOF, 467-70 (1945).
33 SHA3N, op. cit. supra note 32, at 467-8.
34 Hansen v. Isaak, 70 S. D. 529, 19 N. W. (2d) 521 (1945).
35 Crowe et al. v. McBride, 25 Cal. (2d) 318, 153 P. (2d) 727, 728 (1944).
36 Morrison v. Lane, 10 Cal. App. (2d) 519, 52 P. (2d) 530 (1935).
37 Treptau et al. v. Behrens Spa Inc., 247 Wis. 438, 20 N. W. (2d) 108
(1945).
38 Grainger v. Still, 187 Mo. 197, 85 S. W. 1114 (1905). Also see 21 R. C. L.
383 (1918).
39 See e.g., Grainger v. Still, supra note 38.
40 See the following California cases: Hutter v. Hommel, 213 Cal. 677, 3 P.
(2d) 554 (1931); Heslar v. California Hospital Co. et al., 178 Cal. 764, 174 Pac.
654 (1918); Wallace v. LaVine, 36 Cal. App. (2d) 450, 97 P. (2d) 879 (1940);
Abos v. Martyn, 31 Cal. App. (2d) 705, 88 P. (2d) 797 (1939); Elinwood v.
McCoy et al., 8 Cal. App (2d) 590, 47 P. (2d) 796 (1935); Howe et ux. v.
McCoy, 113 Cal. App. 468, 298 Pac. 530 (1931).
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In Hatter v. Hommel, where a homeopathic physician was allowed to
testify against an allopathic practitioner in a malpractice case, the court
stated: 41
. . . we are cited to no rule obtaining in this jurisdiction and know of
none which would preclude a physician trained in one medical school from
testifying in a proper case as to the treatment rendered by a physician
or surgeon trained in a different school . . . where the alleged malprac-
tice is based upon general charges of negligence relating largely to matters
of almost common observation within the experience of every physician
and surgeon.
Of course both practitioners here were within the medical profession.
If a drugless healer steps outside the limits of his licensed field and
invades the general practice of medicine, the rule which confines the
inquiry to rules and principles of his particular school no longer applies.
The testimony of practitioners of other schools is then admissible to
judge the drugless healer by the standards of a medical doctor, be-
cause he acted as one.42
Most states require the drugless healer to be licensed.4 3 Although
the'failure to comply with the licensing statute will subject the violator
to criminal penalties in most jurisdictions, 44 it is not malpractice per
se. The plaintiff must always allege and prove that the injury com-
plained of was due to negligent unskilled treatment.4
5
Punitive damages will be awarded where the defendant's conduct
was reckless, or where he knew of the danger to the patient but pro-
ceeded with gross indifference to the consequences.46 Criminal liability
may ensue if the healer is found guilty of gross and wanton negligence
in administering treatment.47 Prosecution for manslaughter has re-
sulted when the drugless healer exhibited gross incompetency, inatten-
tion, or wanton indifference to his patient's welfare.
48
The inclusion of some groups within the organized school classifica-
tion is highly questionable. Naturopathy is recognized by statute in
41 213 Cal. 677, 3 P. (2d) 554, 556 (1931).
42 Janssen v. Mulder, 232 Mich. 183, 205 N. W. 159 (1925); Kelly v. Car-
roll et ux, .... Wash ..... 219 P. (2d) 79 (1950).
43 IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 63-1312, 63-1316, 63-1402 (Burns 1933); O0o Gm.
CODE ANN. §§ 1274-1, 1288 (1938); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2950, 2975, 2998 (1949).
44 See e.g., People v. Mangiagli, .... Cal ..... , 218 P. (2d) 1025 (1950); People
v. Allcutt, 117 App. Div. 546, 102 N. Y. Supp. 678 (1st Dept 1907); People v.
Knightlinger et a]., 194 Misc. 607, 89 N. Y. S. (2d) 755 (N. Y. County Ct. Gen.
Sess. 1949). Also see State ex rel. Board of Medical Registration and Examina-
tion v. Hayes, .... Ind ...... 91 N. E. (2d) 913 (1950), in which an injunction was
granted.
45 Monohan v. Devinny et al., 131 Misc. 248, 225 N. Y. Supp. 601 (S. Ct.
1927); Hansen v. Isaak, 70 S. D. 529, 19 N. W. (2d) 521 (1945).
46 Olsen et al. v. McAtee, 181 Ore. 503; 182 P. (2d) 979 (1947).
47 State v. Karsunky, 197 Wash. 87, 84 P. (2d) 390 (1938).
48 State v. Lester, 127 Minn. 282, 149 N. W. 297 (1914).
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only a few states today.49 It embraces over sixty different varieties of
healing methods, 50 from ordinary dietetic and gymnastic fads to such
mouth-filling therapeutic titles as biodynamochromatic diagnosis. The
justification of the continued recognition of this school is open to
criticism.
On the other hand, osteopathy has approached nearest to the border-
line separating drugless healing from medicine. Osteopaths have grad-
ually accepted the principal tenets of physicians, until in some respects
it has become a specialized branch of medicine. In this sense, the
continuance of osteopathy as a distinct school of healing is also doubt-
ful.51
In summary, it is seen that the practitioner of a recognized school
of drugless healing is subjected to the same legal rules as medical men-
i.e., the practitioner must diagnose and treat his patients with that
degree of learning and skill, and with such care and judgment that is
generally possessed and employed by practitioners in his locality. The
standard of learning and care, of course is different from the physician
or surgeon, as each school is judged according to its individual stand-
ards and degree of advancement and competence. There is one excep-
tion to the rule that each school is tested by its own standards. That is
when a practitioner usurps the realm of practice of another school.
Then he is judged according to the standards of the school whose prac-
tice he invaded. Finally, as in all negligence actions, the injury must
be proximately caused by the negligence treatment. 52
II.
Nonrecognized Schools
The rule that the skill required of a drugless healer is to be measured
by the principles of his school of practice is contingent upon the status
of that school as one recognized and in good standing. It must have
principles of practice, embracing diagnosis and remedies, for the guid-
ance of its members, which each member must observe.
53 Schools
which do not possess standards or principles of practice are termed non-
recognized-which appelation is more or less repugnant.
49 See the following statutes: D. C. Coms § 2-106 (1940); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 4390 (1949); FLA. STAT. § 462.01 (1949); ORE. ComT. LAWS ANx. § 54-501
(1940); S. C. Cons ANN. §§ 5231-19 to 5231-28 (1942).
50 Comment, 6 FoRD. L. Ra V. 438, 446 (1937). See Milisap v. Anderson et al.,
63 Cal. App. 518, 219 Pac. 469 (1923); State v. Wheaton, 130 Conn. 544, 36 A.
(2d) 118 (1944).
51 See REn, op. cit. supra note 15, at 11-7.
52 Bowles v. Bourbon et al., 147 Tex. 608, 219 S. W. (2d) 779 (1949).
53 Hansen v. Pock, 57 Mont. 51, 187 Pac. 282 (1920). See 21 R. C. L. 383
(1918).
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One who holds himself out to be a clairvoyant physician, where
there is no recognized school designated as clairvoyant, is held to the
standard which is applicable to ordinary physicians in the vicinity, and
not merely to the usual skill of a clairvoyant-whatever that may be.P
If he represents himself as a medical expert, and accepts employment
as a healer of disease, but relies for diagnosis and treatment upon some
occult influence, he takes the risk inherent in his use of intuition.55
The Supreme Court of Missouri, in Longen v. Weltmer,56 held that
a magnetic healer was liable to a patient to whom he had administered
treatment. In this case, ordinary physicians were allowed to testify
that the treatment could not be justified by the rules of recognized
schools, although they admitted that they knew nothing of the prin-
ciples of magnetic healing. Similarly, in Montana, regular physicians
were permitted to testify against a Chinese herb doctor. His own testi-
mony failed to disclose any established rules or methods of practice,
but simply revealed that he was a charlatan, without skill or scientific
knowledge.57 In California, physicians have been permitted to testify
in an action against a beauty doctor who performed a surgical opera-
tion on the plaintiff's lip. 58 A farmer who held himself out as a doc-
tor having skill and experience in the treatment and cure of cancer,
came within this rule. He was required to exercise the skill and care
usually possessed and employed by the general physician in the treat-
ment of this malady. 59
Of interest is the status of the spiritual healers. In New Jersey these
healers do not engage in the practice of medicine so as to violate any
of the state laws,60 but merely propound the triumph of mind over
ills of the body and do not prescribe drugs or material remedies. Con-
versely, in Iowa, a drugless healer who professed to have power to heal
vested in him by the "silent invisible God," and gave treatment by
rubbing his fingertips lightly over the body of the patient, was held to
be practicing without a license and was enjoined from further prac-
tice.6 1
A defendant in a malpractice action cannot interpose a defense
that his treatment conformed to the standard of care usually exercised
by others of his school, if that school has no definite principles or
54 Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 40 N. W. 228 (1888).
55 Ibid.
56 180 Mo. 322, 79 S. W. 655 (1904).
57 Hansen v. Pock, 57 Mont. 51, 187 Pac. 282 (1920).
58 Hall v. Steele, 193 Cal. 602, 226 Pac. 854 (1924).
59 Jacob Musser's Executor v. Melvina Chase, 29 Ohio St. 577 (1876).
60 State Board of Medical Examiners v.. Maxwell, 13 N. J. Misc. 855, 181
Atl. 694 (S. Ct. 1935).
61 State ex rel. Bierring v. Robinson, 236 Iowa 752, 19 N. W. (2d) 214
(1945).
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tenets governing its members. Accordingly he will be held accountable
to the standard of care usually possessed by regular practitioners of
the recognized school which he invaded.
III.
Concluding Observations
The expbnents of healing cults have succeeded in winning the con-
fidence and loosening the pursestrings of a substantial number of per-
sons. Medical men profess scorn for their competitors' techniques,62
and apprehension of the results of their treatments. The drugless
practitioners, secure in the legislative recognition which has been
accorded them in almost all states, continue to flourish without appre-
ciable signs of abatement. Prohibition, assuming it to be constitution-
ally possible, is not desirable. Drugless practitioners have a right to
practice within reasonable limits, and it is extremely doubtful whether
any attempt to legislate them out of existence would reflect the popular
will. Doubtless, many of their pseudo-scientific theories are absurd
and fallacious; but medical men are beginning to realize that they
have much to learn from the healers, especially in the fields of physical
therapy 6 3 and psychotherapy.64
In the courts today an action for malpractice is difficult to maintain.
Practitioners are usually reluctant to testify against members of their
own school, and the public at large is for the most part unable to dis-
tinguish between good and bad practice. These elements, combined
with the conflicting and troublesome rules of evidence concerning expert
testimony, result in a difficult entanglement for both the plaintiff and
the courts to overcome.
Educational standards governing the physician and surgeon have
been steadily raised through the years, with results that have been bene-
ficial to both the profession and the public. Attempts have also been
made to regulate the recognized drugless healers. Even though the
standards formulated for the drugless healer have been far less strin-
gent than those established for the physician, the attempted supervision
of the drugless healer has not been successful.
Even less successful have been attempts to control the honrecognized
schools. This is because the techniques and methods are generally pe-
62 Dr. Morris Fishbein, former editor of the Journal of the American Medical
Association, and Hygeia, has analyzed the tenets of the healing cults at some
length. His conclusions bespeak only scorn for their theories and dogmas. See
in particular his FADs mN QUACxESY N HALinG (1932).
63 Id. at 9.
64 Christian Science, New Thought, and other types of faith healing have
done important ground work in the science of psychotherapy, ie., the treatment
of the accompanying mental illness which is a very important factor in.all disease.
See J~AN, PsxcHor ozcAL HEArjwG 97 (1925).
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culiar to the particular healer. The subjectivity inherent in these tech-
niques prevents effective scientific analysis, and militates against the
formulation of sound rules to govern them. It is submitted, therefore,
that those practitioners adhering to nonrecognized schools are for the
most part detrimental to society. If they persist in their unorthodox,
and often fraudulent treatments, the courts must continue to judge them
according to the standards of the fields of medicine they purport to
practice.
At present civil remedies for malpractice are available against all
who hold themselves out as healers of the human body. The legal rules
applicable to members of non-medical, but recognized schools of healing
are the same as those applied to physicians and surgeons, with the
qualification, that each school is judged according to its particular
standards. On the other hand, practitioners of nonrecognized systems
are held exactly to orthodox medical standards. Whether these civil
remedies are sufficient is open to serious doubt. It appears that they are
not, especially in view of the serious evidentiary problems confronting
the injured patient. Whether the solution is more effective criminal




SOME CURRENT PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE FEDERAL RAILROAD
LIABILITY ACTS
One of the most fruitful sources of litigation in the United States
Supreme Court at the present time I is the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act 2 and its concomitants, the Safety Appliance Act 3 and the
Boiler Inspection Act.4 These statutes were enacted in an effort to
eliminate the difficulties impeding recovery by railroad employees
for industrial injuries.
The first legislation in point of time was the Safety Appliance Act
which became law in 1893 (amended in 1903). It is a remedial
statute designed to effect greater safety in the operation of railroads
by requiring the use of designated safety devices. These devices
included couplers that operate automatically on impact; poiver brakes
I See Wilkerson v. McCarthy et aL., 336 U. S. 53, 76, 69 S. Ct. 413, 93
L. Ed. 497 (1949).
2 35 STAT. 65 et seq. (1908), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 51 et seq. (1946).
3 27 STAT. 531 et seq. (1893), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 1 et seq. (1946).
4 36 STAT. 913 et seq. (1911), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 22-9 (1946).
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that are effective to stop the cars operated on any train; grab irons
and secure handholds on cars; drawbars of standard specifications;
and secure sillsteps, ladders and running boards.
The requirements of the Safety Appliance Act still did not prevent
the unending toll of death and injury that plagued railroad men.
Congress next passed the Federal Employers' Liability Act in 1906, 5
but this was declared unconstituitonal in 1907 on the ground that
it encroached upon the reserved powers of the states.0 The Act as
finally passed in 1908, and amended in 1939,7 is substantially in force
today. It attempts to reduce the uncertainty of a common law re-
covery for death or injury suffered by an employee by limiting the
defenses available to the railroad, e.g., it eliminates the defense of
assumption of risk, the fellow servant doctrine, and makes contribu-
tory negligence a partial instead of an absolute defense. It was ex-
plained by Justice Douglas that:8
The purpose of the Act was to change that strict rule of liability,
to lift from employees the "prodigious burden" of personal injuries
which that system had placed upon them, and to relieve men "who by
the exigencies and necessities of life are bound to labor" from the risks
and hazards that could be avoided or lessened "by the exercise of proper
care on the part of the employer in providing safe and proper ma-
chinery and equipment with which the employee does his work."
The Boiler Inspection Act is similar in form to the Safety Appli-
ance Act in that it establishes minimum safety standards for boilers,
locomotives, tenders and appurtenances. This statute, enacted in
1911 and amended several times, gives broad authorization to the
Interstate Commerce Commission to establish standards by prescrib-
ing "rules and regulations by which fitness for service shall be de-
termined," 9 provided the Commission finds that such rules are re-
quired to eliminate unreasonable safety risks.10
These three Acts are independent, although their subject matter
is in many instances the same. This independence, without an ade-
quate dovetailing of the Acts, has caused an overflow of litigation
testing the limits of each Act and searching the twilight zone between
the provisions. 1 In one instance the Supreme Court in dicta stated 12
5 34 STAT. 232 (1906).
6 Howard v. Illinois Central Ry., 207 U. S. 463, 28 S. Ct. 141, 52 L.
Ed. 297 (1907).
7 53 STAT. 1404-5 (1939), 45 U. S. C. §§ 51, 54, 56, 60 (1946).
8 Wilkerson v. McCarthy et al., 336 U. S. 53, 68, 69 S. Ct. 413, 93 L. Ed.
497 (1949), citing H. R. REP. No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1908).
9 Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 272 U. S. 605, 612, 47 S. Ct. 207,
71 L. Ed. 432 (1926).
10 United States et al. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. et al., 293 U. S. 454,
55 S. Ct. 268, 79 L. Ed. 587 (1935).
11 WRlkerson v. McCarthy et al., 336 U. S. 53, 66, 69 S. Ct. 413, 93
L. Ed. 497 (1949).
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that the Safety Appliance Act and Boiler Inspection Act are sub-
stantially, if not in form, amendments to the Federal Employers'
Liability Act because they dispense with the necessity of proving
that violations of the safety statutes constitute negligence.
This triumvirate of legislation was enacted by Congress under its
plenary powers over interstate and foreign commerce.' 3 Like Topsy,
the coverage "just grew and grew" and the confusion is reflected in
the decisions of the courts, the hazy pleadings of the lawyers in rail-
road injury cases,14 and the injustice done to railroad workers in
attempting to secure redress for industrial injuries. 15 These defects
have been assailed on the ground that the whole system of railroad
liability legislation is a throwback to the more barbarous days of
trial by fire and wager of law. The leader of this crusade on the
Supreme Court is Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who in Urie v. Thomp-
son,16 an action based on the FELA and Boiler Inspection Act, while
concurring in part, said:
At the risk of wearisome reiteration it is relevant to say again that
the common law concept of negligence is an antiquated and uncivilized
basis for working out rights and duties for disabilities and deaths in-
evitably due to the conduct of modem industry. In the conscious or
unconscious endeavor not to have the human cost of industry fall with
cruel injustice upon workers and their families, the law of negligence
gives rise to endless casuistry. So long as the gamble of an occasional
heavy verdict is not replaced by the security of a modem system of
insurance, courts must continue to apply the notion of negligence in
situations for which it was never intended.
Other decisions have been enlivened by similar judicial attacks on the
application of negligence theories in a complex industrial society.17
The epitome was reached when negligence and proximate cause in these
actions were compared to catching butterflies without a net.' 8
12 Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163, 189, 69 S. Ct. 1018, 93 L. Ed. 1282
(1949).
13 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196, 6 L. Ed. 23 (U. S. 1824).
14 See O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 338 U. S. 384, 392, 70 S. Ct. 200,
94 L. Ed. 187 (1949), where Mr. Justice Jackson stated: "We no longer
'insist upon technical rules of pleading, but it will ever be difficult in a jury
trial to segregate issues which counsel do not separate in their pleading, prepa-
ration or thinking."
15 See e.g., Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield; Missouri ex rel.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Murphy, 340 U. S ..... , 71 S. Ct. 1, 95 L.. Ed...
(1950) (proceedings in their third year in court and again remanded for a
new trial); Mazula v. Delaware & Hudson R. R., 90 F. Supp. 966 (S. D.
N. Y. 1950) (extended delay in commencing trial in district court).
16 337 U. S. 163, 196, 69 S. Ct. 1018, 93 L. Ed. 1282 (1949).
17 Wilkerson v. McCarthy et al., 336 U. S. 53, 65, 69 S. Ct. 413, 93 L. Ed.
497 (1949).
18 Carter v. Atlanta & St. A. B. Ry., 338 U. S. 430, 437, 70 S. Ct. 226,




The three Acts protect different classes of people. The FELA
covers employees only; the plain wording of the Safety Appliance
and Boiler Inspection Acts make them applicable to both employees
and travelers, and by implication to employees of independent con-
tractors injured by failure of a railroad to comply with the pro-
visions of the Acts. In one case, 19 the Safety Appliance Act was
construed to cover travelers on a highway who were injured in a col-
lision with a train which did not have the required power brakes.
It was averred by the Court that the title of the Act does not state
its sole purpose, but is an aid to construction of ambiguous provi-
sions. Since Congress surely would have in mind the safety of all
persons affected by the use of these devices, the Court reasoned that
travelers on highways which intersect railroad right of ways were also
protected. To confine the benefits to employees and passengers alone
would be to impute to Congress an intention to ignore the equally
important safety of other travelers. Under a recent decision, the
Safety Appliance Act has been extended to cover all persons who need
protection from dangerous situations created by the maintenance or
operation of prohibited defective appliances.
20
The limits of this liberal trend do not extend to those employees
who work on defective equipment withdrawn from use, nor do they
apply to any passengers or third parties who conceivably might be
injured by railroad equipment withdrawn from service. The strict
requirement of the statute that the car or engine be "in use" at the
time of the injury has been upheld in several cases. If a car is found
defective and reaches a place of repair, the Safety Appliance Act no
longer applies. By express provision of the 1910 amendment, 2 ' the
railroad is exempted from the penal sum 22 exacted for violation of
the Act while the defective car is being removed to a place of repair,
but during the movement the railroad is still liable for any injury
19 Fairport, P. & E. R. R. v. Meredith, 292 U. S. 589, 54 S. Ct. 826, 78
L. Ed. 1446 (1934). See also Brady v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n, 303 U. S. 10,
58 S. Ct. 426, 82 L. Ed. 614 (1938).
20 Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., 335 U. S. 520, 69 S. Ct. 275, 93 L. Ed.
208 (1949).
21 The Act itself does not provide a cause of action for recovery for
injuries, but rather provides for the recovery of a penal sum for its violation.
However, the courts have generally followed an early case that held that a
recovery could be had under the Act, and that the existence of the right of
private action, even without legislation, had never been doubted. Texas & Pa-
cific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 36 S. Ct. 482, 60 L. Ed. 874 (1916). See
also Swinson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 294 U. S. 529, 55 S. Ct. 517,
79 L. Ed. 1041 (1935).
22 36 STAT. 299 (1910), as amended, 45U. S. C. § 13 (1946).
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to an employee caused by the defect. Once repairs have been com-
menced, use or movements of the car incidental to repair are outside
the provisions of the Act. This rule is clearly illustrated in New
York, C. & St. L. R. R. v. Kelly,23 where the circuit court held that
after a defective car reaches a place of repair, the Safety Appliance
Act is inapplicable because the car has been withdrawn from service,
is not in use, and any incidental shifting does not put it in use. In
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Hooven,24 the Safety Appliance Act was
held not to apply to a locomotive withdrawn from service and under-
going minor repairs in preparation for an early return to service.
In one attempted defense, a railroad sought to show that a car
was not in use because it was motionless, even though it had become
so because a coupling had broken. The court decided that the car
was in use even though standing.2 5 Brady v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n 26
held that a car remained in use although it was awaiting inspection
to determine whether it met the requirements of the regulations. How-
ever, despite these distinctions, generally it can be said that repair
men employed by railroads are not covered by the Safety Appliance
Act while making repairs.
The Boiler Inspection Act similarly recognizes the necessity for
actual use of the equipment. In Lyle v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.,2 7
it was held that a locomotive was not being "used" when the run had
ended and the engine had been turned over to a hostler's helper for
servicing. The recent trend in FELA decisions towards granting re-
covery to "backshop" workers would provide a right of action if
negligence could be shown and if interstate commerce were affected.
28
The Boiler Act would do away with any necessity to prove negli-
gence, but if this Act does not apply, a finding of negligence would
warrant a recovery under FELA. Apparently the repair workers can
be said to have "assumed the risk" of working with defective cars.
Their only compensating advantage is the application by the FELA of
the common law doctrine that the more dangerous the place, the
greater the care required of the employer to provide a safe place and
safe tools,2 9 but even so, these workers have no recourse to the Appli-
ance Act or the Boiler Act while making repairs.
Under the FELA, coverage is extended to employees of interstate
railroads only while engaged in interstate activities and, since 1939,
23 70 F. (2d) 548 (7th Cir. 1934).
24 297 Fed. 919 (6th Cir. 1924).
25 Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. v. Goneau, 269 U. S. 406,'46 S. Ct.
129, 70 L. Ed. 335 (1926).
26 303 U. S. 10, 58 S. Ct. 426, 82 L. Ed. 614 (1938).
27 177 F. (2d) 221 (7th Cir. 1949).
28 See Note, Employees in Interstate Commerce and the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 25 NoTRE DAmE LAw. 711 (1950).
29 Pitt v. Pennsylvania R. R., 66 F. Supp. 443 (E. D. Pa. 1946); Handy v.
Reading Co., 66 F. Supp. 246 (E. D. Pa. 1946).
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in activities closely and substantially affecting such commerce. The
injuries must be incurred through negligence of the railroad, its offi-
cers, agents, or employees, or through negligently caused defects or
insufficiencies in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, road-
bed, works, wharves, boats and other equipment. So the essentials
of the employee's case are: first, employee status, secondly, employ-
ment in interstate commerce, and lastly, injury due to the negligence
of the railroad.
The employment status of the injured worker under the FELA
has recently been considered by several courts. The term "employee"
in the Act has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to describe the
conventional relation of master and servant.30 This relation is usually
dependent upon the "right to direct the manner in which the business
should be done"; 31 or stated differently, its existence is determined by
ascertaining whose work was being performed at the time of the in-
jury.3 2 In Pennsylvania R. R. v. Roth 33 and Pennsylvania R. R. v.
Barlion,3 4 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held employees of an
independent contractor to be employees of the railroad within the
purview of the FELA, since the railroad retained the right to direct
the work of the contractor. The railroad had agreed with the Federal
Government to provide a storage yard on its line, and had entered
into a contract with a third party to unload cars, to stencil, mark,
and store inbound shipments, and to remark and reload outbound
shipments. The railroad retained direction of the movement of cars
and authority to change the unloading, storing and shipping opera-
tions. The employees injured were engaged by different independent
contractors at different times, but the contracts were essentially the
same. Piercing the independent contractor status, the court found
that the railroad had retained the right to control the employees;
thus the employees were held to be covered by the Act.
A different result was obtained by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in Miles v. Pennsylvania R. R.,35 where the employee of an
independent contractor was not permitted to recover under the FELA.
There, the railroad entered into an agreement with the contractor
for the construction of new and additional trackage. At the time of
30 Hull v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry., 252 U. S. 475, 40 S. Ct. 358, 64
L. Ed. 670 (1920); Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 237 U. S. 84, 35 S. Ct.
491, 59 L. Ed. 849 (1915).
31 Chicago, R. I. & P. R.R. v. Bond, 240 U. S. 449, 456, 36 S. Ct. 403,
60 L. Ed. 735 (1916).
32 Linstead v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 276 U. S. 28, 34, 48 S. Ct. 241, 72
L. Ed. 453 (1928).
33 163 F. (2d) 161 (6th Cir. 1947).
34 172 F. (2d) 710 (6th Cir. 1949).
35 182 F. (2d) 411 (7th Cir. 1950).
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the injury the actual construction had been 90 percent completed,
and the workers were engaged in the normal maintenance tasks of
railroad employees.
To claim benefits under the Act it is necessary to show actual
employment by a railroad, or an intervening contract between the
railroad company and a third party which would be void as an attempt
to escape liability under the FELA (as provided in Section 5 of the
Act).36 It would appear from the cases that the better test is control
by the railroad; if there is control, the employee will be entitled to
recover for negligent injury under the FELA.
One case,3 7 involving a student trainee serving without pay in
order to qualify himself for the position of yard clerk, was decided
by application of the coordinate tests of the right to control the
manner in which the work should be done, and whose work was being
performed. The fact that the employee received no compensation
was not determinative.
This problem will occupy a greater share of attention as the rail-
roads attempt to hire out the more hazardous construction or opera-
tional jobs. The independent contractor relationship must be decided
on its peculiar facts and in ordinary cases no one feature of the rela-
tfonship is controlling, although, as stated above, the "right to con-
trol" test is the most significant at the present time.
The foregoing outline of railroad liability under federal legislation
indicates the various requirements for bringing an action for a par-
ticular injury under one or the other of the Acts. While these Acts
operate concomitantly in many instances and cannot be considered
apart from one another, it is manifest that they are not uniform in
scope and operation. This absence of integration may be readily
observed from the following comparison.
Appliance and Boiler Acts Employers' Liability Act
Persons Covered Employees, travelers, inde- Railroad employees, inde-
pendent contractors, and pendent contractors only
strangers. if working under direct
control of the railroad.
When Covered When equipment is in use. At all times whether the
equipment is in use or
not, stationary or mov-
ing.
Where Covered Interstate or intrastate (ex- Interstate or closely af-
cept interurban railroads fecting interstate corn-
and street cars). merce.
36 35 STAT. 66 (1908), as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 55 (1946).
37 Watkins v. Thompson, 72 F. Supp. 953 (E. D. Mo. 1947).
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Duty Imposed on Carrier
Source of Action
Cause of Action





Appliance and Boiler Acts
Absolute duty to have re-
quired appliances in safe
condition.
Common law action for
breach of a statutory
duty.
Employers' Liability Act
Observance of the stand-
ard of care of the rea-
sonable man.
Statutory right of action.
Damages resulting from Damages resulting from
breach of a required duty. negligence.
State or federal district
where the railroad is do-
ing business.
(1) Equipment not in use.
(2) Injury not proximate-
ly caused by the de-
fective equipment.
(1) Assumption of risk.
(2) Contributory negli-
gence.
State or federal district
where the railroad is
doing business.
(1) Due care.
(2) Lack of employment
status.
(3) Not in or closely af-
fecting interstate com-
merce.
(4) Contributory n e g Ii-
gence is available to
diminish damages.
Assumption of risk.
Evidentiary Problems Under the Safety Appliance Act
The courts, in dealing with the question of railroad liability under
the Safety Appliance Act, need concern themselves with only two
considerations: first, whether there has been a violation of the Act;
and secondly, whether that violation was a contributing factor to the
injury complained of. Questions of contributory negligence, assump-
tion of risk, and due care are inappropriate, the only defenses avail-
able to the employer being the absence of any violation of the safety
provisions of the statute, or the lack of a causal relationship between
the violation and the injury. 38 Observed in this light the operation
of the statute appears to be simple and without many of the nebulous
aspects which have hindered the efficient administration of the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act.39
38 ".. . the duty under the Acts is not based on the negligence of the
carrier but is an absolute one requiring performance 'on the occasion in question.'
Affolder v. New York C. & St. L. R. R., 339 U. S. 96, 98, 70 S. Ct. 509, 94
L. Ed. 683 (1950).
39 See Note, Employees in Interstate Commerce and The Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act, 25 NoTRa DAm LAw. 711 (1950).
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It is surprising then to find the Safety Appliance Act being con-
tinually involved in a quantity of litigation in which the courts ex-
perience no little difficulty in resolving commonplace problems. The
question of proximate cause, among others, has received questionable
treatment on more than a single occasion. In Carter v. Atlanta & St.
A. B. Ry.,40 the court directed the jury to find that a violation of the
Act was not the cause of the injury sustained by the complainant in
the action. It appeared in evidence that there had been a separation
in a string of railroad cars due to the failure of a coupler to connect
properly upon impact as required by the statute. The plaintiff, a
workman, upon noticing the separation, jumped on the uncoupled car
in an effort to stop it. He succeeded in his effort, but was injured by
a second impact which occurred when the engineer, who was unaware
of the failure to couple on the first impact, backed the train into the
car stopped by the plaintiff. The effect of the trial court's ruling, as
above stated, was to deny the jury the right to find that the viola-
tion was a contributing factor to the plaintiff's injury. This position
is difficult to support inasmuch as a finding of liability would have
some basis in tort law,41 and the liability under the Act is unques-
tionably of a more stringent nature. Approving the narrow view taken
by the district court, the circuit court of appeal found that the defect
in the coupler was the "remote, not the proximate cause of plaintiff's
injuries," 42 and thereupon it affirmed. The Supreme Court dealt
more directly with the phantom proposition of proximate cause,
43
and speaking through Justice Clark, ascertained that the ruling of
the trial court was erroneous. It remanded the case for a new trial,
stating in the course of the opinion:
44
Certainly there was evidence upon which a jury could find a causal
relation between the failure to couple, the action of petitioner in run-
ning and stopping the rolling car, the engineer's justified assumption
that the car had coupled when in fact it had failed to do so, and the
continued movement of the train into the standing car, thus causing
injury.
It seems that personal sentiments and conservative attitudes are the
only explanation for the restricted application which the Act received
in the lower courts. Certainly these are not in keeping with the treat-
ment which was intended to be given this social legislation.
In Meyers v. Reading Co.,45 the court refused a motion for a di-
rected verdict upon application of the defendant employer and sub-
mitted the case together with special interrogatories to the jury. The
40 170 F. (2d) 719 (5th Cir. 1948).
41 Scott v. Shepherd, 3 Wils. 403, 95 Eng. Rep. 1124 (1773).
42 170 F. (2d) 719, 721 (5th Cir. 1948).
43 .338 U. S. 430, 70 S. Ct. 226, 94 L. Ed. 236 (1949).
44 Id., 338 U. S. at 435.
45 63 F. Supp. 817 (E. D. Pa. 1945).
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jury specifically found that there had been a failure to comply with
the provisions of the statute and that the plaintiff's injury was a re-
sult of the violation. The court thereafter granted the defendant
a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict stating:4 6
From the paucity of proof offered by the plaintiff the jury might
logically draw the inference that the brake was inefficient and might
have just as logically drawn the inference that the brake reacted nor-
mally and efficiently under the circumstances. Since the evidence sup-
ports equally two inconsistent inferences of fact, it establishes neither.
The plaintiff in this case asserted -that he was injured when a hand-
brake failed to operate properly, causing him to be thrown to the
ground. During the course of the trial he testified that the brake did
not react in a normal fashion and that it was this failure to operate
that caused his injury.47 The court held in effect that from the evi-
dence presented only one conclusion was legally permissible-that
nothing was established. The statement of the court that the evi-
dence supported "equally two inconsistent inferences of fact" 48 was
not wholly correct because the plaintiff explicitly testified that the
brake did not operate as a normal brake and that this abnormality
was the cause of his injury. The district court's ruling was affirmed
by the circuit court 49 but reversed by the Supreme Court.50  Quot-
ing from Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry.,5 1 Justice Burton, speaking
for the Court, said:
52
"Petitioner was required to present probative facts from which the
negligence and the causal relation could reasonably be inferred. 'The
essential requirement is that mere speculation be not allowed to do duty
for probative facts, after making due allowance for all reasonably pos-
sible inferences favoring the party whose case is attacked.' Galloway
v. United States. .... "
After finding that there was some evidence on which the jury could,
if they believed it, rest a verdict for the plaintiff, the Court went on
to hold that the action of the trial court could not be permitted under
the Federal Constitution as it invaded the plaintiff's right of trial
by jury. The meager quantity of the plaintiff's evidence appears to
have been the basis of the decision of the district court. It evidently
40 Id. at 821.
47 Id. at 819 n.3: "Q. With the ordinary brake wheel, do you have the
difficulty that you had with this wheel? A. Not ordinarily. Q. What was the
difference between this wheel and the ordinary wheel? A. It was kind of stiff,
and like a spring,--like a shoe kicking back. Q. And you started to try to set it?
A. That is right.... Q. What 'happened to the wheel on the hand-brake while
you were holding the wheel? A. That kicked back .... Q. Could you hold it?
A. No, I couldn't.... Q. What happened to you? A. Down I went."
48 Id. at 821.
49 155 F. (2d) 523 (3rd Cir. 1946).
50 331 U. S. 477, 67 S. Ct. 1334, 91 L. Ed. 1615 (1947).
51 321 U. S. 29, 32, 64 S. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed. 520 (1944).
52 331 U. S. 477, 485, 67 S. Ct. 1334, 91 L. Ed. 1615 (1947).
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did not consider too seriously, the rule which has been reiterated by
the Supreme Court that it is for the jury to pass on the credibility
of the evidence, it being "immaterial that the court might draw a con-
trary inference or feel that another conclusion is more reasonable." r3
The Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit faced a similar diffi-
culty when it reversed a judgment of a district court and ordered
judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict in favor of
the plaintiff. 54 The finding of the circuit court was that the plaintiff
was not making a proper effort to operate a brake which was alleged
to have been defective and therefore no inference of a defect was
permissible: 55
Certainly the fact that it did not operate while he was awkwardly
positioned on the car is no proof of defect, and we think the fact that
it operated so readily after he was properly positioned dispels any
inference of defect that might arise from his previous unsuccessful
efforts.
On the authority of Meyers v. Reading Co., discussed at length above,
the Supreme Court reversed without opinion.5 6 These cases indicate
that, unless the statute is to be rendered ineffective, courts must permit
juries to pass on even meager evidence.
Another factor contributing to the large volume of litigation under
the Safety Appliance Act is the inability of trial courts to instruct
properly the jury as to the nature of the liability which is placed upon
the railroads when there has been a violation of the statute. All too
frequently negligence theories creep into the issues, or are inter-
mingled with instructions concerning the Act when general negligence
causes are joined with statutory causes. 5 7 For example, the follow-
ing instruction resulted in a verdict for the defendant railroad:
5 8
"Now, as I have told you in the beginning, the fact of an accident
carries with it no presumption of negligence on the part of the defend-
ant. That is an affirmative fact for the plaintiff to prove. Plaintiff must
prove that the defendant has been guilty of negligence as alleged in
the plaintiff's complaint, one of these three things that I -have been
enumerating to you. It is not sufficient for the plaintiff to show that
the defendant may possibly have been guilty of negligence."
53 Lavender v. Kurns, 327 U. S. 645, 653, 66 S. Ct. 740, 90 L. Ed. 916 (1946).
54 Penn v. Chicago & N. W. R. R., 163 F. (2d) 995 (7th Cir. 1947).
55 Id. at 997.
56 335 U. S. 849, 69 S. Ct. 79, 93 L. Ed. 398 (1948).
57 See e.g., Long v. Union R. R., 175 F. (2d) 198, 201 (3rd Cir. 1949),
where the following instruction was quoted: "Now the first question, above aL
for you to determine is the matter of the negligence. Has the Plaintiff, by the
fair preponderance of the evidence, established that this was a car unfit for use
by reason of failure of its brakes, or did he not? If you find by the fair pre-
ponderance that it was such a car, and was put in use by the Defendant for
operation, that in itself would constitute negligence on the part of the De-
fendant." [Emphasis supplied.]
58 O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 171 F. (2d) 973, 978 (7th Cir. 1948).
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The court of appeals found these instructions to be an adequate and
proper explanation of the law. Justice Minton, then sitting on the
circuit court, was not convinced of the clarity of the instructions and
dissented: "The court's instructions, in effect, told the jury that it
could not infer negligence from the happening of the accident, name-
ly, the breaking of the coupler .... This was error." 59 The Supreme
Court later reversed with Justice Jackson speaking for the Court in
an opinion which properly stated the rule without any reference to
the law of negligence: 60
As to the claim based on the Safety Appliance Act, we hold that
the plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction that to equip a car
with a coupler which broke in the switching operation was a viola-
tion of the Act, which rendered defendant liable for injuries proximately
resulting therefrom, and that neither evidence of negligence nor of dili-
gence and care was to be considered on the question of this liability.
Negligence theories are unnecessarily alluded to by counsel in their
pleadings, and by courts in instructions to juries and in opinions.
This improper use of legalistic terminology has only served to further
hinder the efforts of railroad workers and their employers in the quest
for justice under the Act.
III.
Conclusion
As has been seen, these independent, but somewhat concomitant
Acts, were primarily designed to give the railroad worker adequate
protection and redress for industrial injuries. The Boiler Inspection
and Safety Appliance Acts have even been extended to travelers or
anyone else injured as the result of a violation of the Acts. As an
attempt at social reform the Acts have done away with the common
law defense of assumption of risk, and for the most part with con-
tributory negligence. Even though they are designed to effect social
justice, the Acts still are intimately connected with the doctrine of
negligence. The Employers' Liability Act makes it the basis of re-
covery; the other two Acts attempt to do away with it and impose
liability absolutely, but the legislative effort has been stymied by
both lawyers and courts which insist upon injecting questions of
negligence into the litigations.
With this in mind, and recalling that the Acts overlap and at the
same time leave gaps in their coverage, the question arises whether
they have fulfilled the purposes for which they were created. It seems
obvious that they have failed to empower the courts to give efficient
and desirable relief to those suffering the effects of industrial acci-
59 Ibid.
60 333 U. S. 384, 394, 70 S. Ct. 200, 94 L. Ed. 187 (1949).
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dents. The remedies which are provided for railroad workers have
become outmoded and archaic in a highly industrialized society which
has accepted more comprehensive compensation laws as a proper
means of effecting social justice. It is only by giving to railroad work-
ers the remedies which have been accorded millions in other industries
that a satisfactory solution will be achieved. Requiring negligence to
exist before recovery can be had serves only to impose unnecessary
burden and expense on the hapless plaintiff. The elimination of this
penumbral theory would do much to make social justice a reality in
the trade of railroading. 6
1
F. Richard Kramer
George J. Murphy, Jr.
Trade Regulation
MISBRANDING OF FOOD UNDER THE FEDERAL
FOOD, DRUG AND COSMETIC ACT
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 1 has for its purpose
the protection of the consuming public from the ill effects, both
physical and financial, resulting from the distribution of impure and
unfit products. In enacting this statute, Congress also intended to
safeguard the interests of the honest individuals engaged in the food
and drug trade who might be injured by the stigma drawn upon them
by the unscrupulous conduct of the few who would defraud the
public. These ends are accomplished by the enforcement of defini-
tions and standards of identity, quality, and quantity established
by the Act and effectuated in regulations promulgated by the Fed-
eral Security Administrator.
The Act in effect today was enacted in 1938. It superseded the
Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.2 Though they are technically
separate and distinct, the similarity of some of the provisions found
in both permits the current use of some of the case law decided
under the old statute. Unless specific reference is made to another
statute, when the term "Act" is used here it will refer to the present
statute.
61 See Note, Employees in Interstate Commerce and The Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 25 No=RE DA=z LAw. 711, 721 (1950).
1 52 STAT. 1040 et seq. (1938), 21 U. S. C. §§ 301 et seq. (1946).
2 34 STAT. 768 et seq. (1906).
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The great bulk of litigation concerning food arises under two sec-
tions of the Act: the section on adulteration 3 and the section on
misbranding.4 Only the misbranding of food 5 will be considered here.
False and Misleading Labeling
Section 403 (a) 6 of the Act states that a food shall be deemed
to be misbranded if its labeling7 ". . . is false or misleading in any
particular." 8 This disjunctive wording allows a wide latitude in
dealing with situations where the label of a product is misleading
although the statements contained on it are entirely true. The clever
labeler who accomplishes this deception is nevertheless subject to
prosecution under the Act.9 Section 403(a) is designed to apply to
all types of misrepresentations whether they be misstatements of
origin, identity, quality or effect; whether made as averments of fact
or statements of opinion; and whether conveyed directly or by im-
plication.
Misbranding may also result from the omission of certain facts
which are required on the label. Section 201 (n) 10 of the Akct faces
this problem by providing that the failure to include necessary facts
in the labeling is to be taken into account in determining the ques-
3 52 STAT. 1046 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 342 (1946).
4 52 STAT. 1047 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 343 (1946). False or misleading ad-
vertising in circulars and newspapers, one of the major problems of consumer
protection, is more properly within the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Com-
mission. The Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 STAT. 717 et seq. (1914), as
amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 41 et seq. (1946), authorizes the Federal Trade Com-
mission to cope- with false and misleading advertising. The Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act is applicable only to labels and labeling, which includes all
written or graphic matter placed upon any article, the container or wrapper, or
accompanying literature. 52 STAT. 1041 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 321(m) (1946).
5 52 STAT. 1041, 21 U. S. C. § 321 (1946), states: "The term 'food' means
(1) articles used for food or drink for man or other animals, (2) chewing gum,
and (3) articles used for components of any such article."
6 52 STAT. 1047 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 343(a) (1946).
7 Whild the terms "label" and "labeling" will be used interchangeably in
this article for reasons of practical convenience and to avoid repetition, the Act
distinguishes them. A label is written or graphic matter appearing on the article
or on the container enclosing the article. 52 STAT. 1041 (1938), 21 U. S. C.
§ 321(k) (1946). "Labeling" includes labels as defined above and also may be
used to describe written or graphic matter which accompanies but does not en-
close the article. 52 STAT. 1041 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 321(m) (1946).
8 See 21 CoDE FED. Rws. § 1.7 (1949), for specific examples.
9 United States v. 95 Barrels, More or Less, Alleged Apple Cider Vinegar,
Douglas Packing Co., 265 U.. S. 438, 442, 44 S. Ct. 529, 68 L. Ed. 1094 (1924),
reversing 289 Fed. 181 (6th Cir. 1923). The statute is plain and direct. Its com-
prehensive terms condemn every statement, design and device which may mislead
or deceive. Deception may result from the use of statements not technically false
which even may be literally true.
10 52 STAT. 1041 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 321(n) (1946).
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tion of misbranding, and is to weigh equally with positive misstate-
ments. Also, where ingredients are stated on the label but found in
only negligible quantities in the product, the item is deemed mis-
branded.1
If the label makes a misleading comparison between the food so
labeled and another product, the food has been held to be mis-
branded. An example of this is United States v. Ninety-Five Barrels
of Vinegar,'2 where the Supreme Court held that vinegar processed
from dried apples to which water had been added equivalent in
amount to that removed during the drying and fermenting process,
was not the same as vinegar produced from fresh apple cider. Even
though equally wholesome, the Court felt that it was misleading to
label the product "Apple Cider Vinegar Made from Selected Apples."
The language of section 403(a) and the illustrations contained
in the Code of Federal Regulations 13 clearly show that a consumer
need not be actually deceived, 14 and no actual intent to deceive need
exist in order to subject the labeler to prosecution. The test as far
as the manufacturer's intent is concerned, is restricted to an analysis
of the label itself; 15 the actual intent of the labeler or manufacturer
is immaterial.
Offer for Sale under False Name
An effective protection for the honest manufacturer whose product
has a fine reputation is provided by section 403(b).16 This sub-
section states that a food shall be deemed misbranded if ". .. it is
offered for sale under the name of another food." In addition, of
course, the consumer is protected from purchasing inferior goods
foisted upon him by misleading labeling.
Labeling a food which contains two or more ingredients with the
names of some but not all of them constitutes a violation of this
subsection.' 7 This is true even though all of the ingredients are
listed elsewhere on the label.' 8 Beans were found to be misbranded
because they were offered for sale as "White Kidney Beans" when
11 United States v. Roma Packing Co. and Richard Catalanotti, Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act Notice of judgment No. 15241, May, 1950.
12 265 U. S. 438, 44 S. Ct. 529, 68 L. Ed. 1094 (1924), reversing, 289 Fed.
181 (6th Cir. 1923).
13 21 CODE FED. RFs. §§ 1.7(a),(b) (1949).
14 Compare the common law doctrine of misrepresentation which requires
a showing of actual deception before damages were awarded. E.g., Ellis v. New-
brough et al., 6 N. M. 181, 27 Pac. 490 (1891).
15 McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115, 132-3, 33 S. Ct. 431, 57 L. Ed.
754 (1913).
16 52 STAT. 1047 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 343(b) (1946).
17 21 CODE FED. RFGS. § 1.7(b) (1949).
Is Ibid.
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in fact they were Great Northern beans.19 The same result obtained
where the food product consisted of coffee and ground cereal and
was offered for sale under the name "Coffee." 20
,Imitation of Another Food
While dishonesty is discouraged and truthful labeling is the raison
d'etre of the Act, it does not follow that all imitations are prohibited.
Section 403(c) 21 expressly permits the marketing of foods which
are imitations of other products if the label on the imitation food
contains the word "imitation" in type of uniform size and promi-
nence. Congress obviously did not intend to prohibit the sale of
wholesome imitations of expensive food products to an economy
conscious public.
This subsection clearly allows the marketing of properly labeled
imitations. But does it permit a manufacturer to imitate a food for
which a standard of identity has been established by the Federal
Security Administrator? 22 This has been answered recently by the
Supreme Court in 62 Cases, More or Less, Each Containing Six Jars
of Jam v. United States.23 The Court held that the marketing of
"imitation jam" was not forbidden merely because the Administrator
had prescribed a standard of identity for jam, nor merely because
the imitation jam did not meet the standard. The controversy cen-
tered upon conflicting paragraphs of section 403 of the Act. Sub-
section (c) is from the original Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 24
while subsection (g) was added in 1938. The latter condemns as
misbranded a product which purports to be a food the ingredients
of which the Administrator has standardized and which does not
conform to the standards prescribed.2 5 The Government sought to
condemn tHe 62 cases of jam, labeled as "Delicious Brand Imitation
Jam," insisting that the product purported to be fruit jam and that
19 United States v. 47 Cases . . . , Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act Notice of
Judgment No. 16333, November, 1950.
20 United States v. 120 Bags . . . , Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act Notice
of Judgment No. 15851, July, 1950.
21 52 STAT. 1047 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 343(c) (1946).
22 Section 401 of the Act states: "Whenever in the judgment of the Secre-
tary [the Secretary of Agriculture has been replaced by the Federal Security Ad-
ministrator as administrator of the Act. See Reorganization Plan IV, § 12, 54
STAT. 1237 (1940), effectuated by 54 STAT. 231 (1940), 5 U. S. C. § 133(u) (1946)]
such action will promote honesty and fair dealing in the interest of consumers,
he shall promulgate regulations fixing and establishing for any food, under its
common or usual name so far as practicable, a reasonable definition and standard
of identity, a reasonable standard of quality, and/or reasonable standards of fill
of container .... " 52 STAT. 1046 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 341 (1946).
23 340 U. S ..... 71 S. Ct. 515, 95 L. Ed. _... (1951).
24 34 STAT. 768 (1906).
25 52 STAT. 1047 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 343(g) (1946).
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it failed to meet the standards established by the Administrator. 26
The Court, however, found that the product was in fact what it
purported to be, imitation jam, and that it was so labeled. It did
not purport to be genuine jam for which the Administrator had
promulgated standards.
Section 403(c) requires the word imitation to be placed on the
label in type of uniform size and prominence. In practice, the type
or print must be large enough to attract the attention of purchasers.
This means that a purchaser need not minutely inspect the label
to determine whether or not the product is an imitation. To avoid
any controversy the word imitation should be the same size as the
other words describing the product.27
Deceptive Containers
The 1906 Act guarded against positive misstatements or omissions
concerning quantity,28 but it failed to prevent the use of deceptively
shaped, or filled containers. Section 403(d) 29 of the 1938 Act reme-
died this by describing a food as misbranded "if its container is so
made, formed, or filled as to be misleading." Whether the container
is filled so as to be misleading is a question of fact, turning on
whether the ordinary buyer, who is not particularly attentive or
prudent, would be misled.30 The judgment of ". . . experts or men
of peculiar training, experience, shrewdness or sophistication . . . "31
is not the criterion. The expectations of a person who has an aver-
age familiarity with our industrial civilization furnish the standard
which Congress intended to apply. Therefore, this subsection does
not require maximum filling of packages, but rather a packaging
which relates reasonably to efficient methods of mass packaging by
machine.
32
Further, as it is stated in the Act, the Administrator in prescrib-
ing standards of fill for containers must consider the natural shrink-
26 21 CoDE FED. REs. § 29.0 (1949).
27 No reported federal cases have been found illustrating the provision under
section 403(c) of the Act requiring that the word "imitation" be of the same
prominence. However, see People v. Treichler, 178 App. Div. 718, 165 N. Y.
Supp. 453 (4th Dep't 1917), where the word "compound" was printed in type
so small as not to attract ordinary attention; a finding of misbranding within
the meaning of section 201 of the New York Agricultural Law of 1909, now
N. Y. AGRICULTURE AND MARxm's LAW § 201, was made.
28 34 STAT. 771 (1906). Under the 1906 Act a food was deemed misbranded
if the contents were not stated in terms of weight and measure on the outside
of the package.
29 52 STAT. 1047 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 343(d) (1946).
80 United States v. 116 Boxes, etc. Arden Assorted Candy Drops, 80 F. Supp.




age of fresh food in storage and transit, and the need for protective
packing material. 33 According to the Senate Committee on Com-
merce, "this provision [Section 403(d)] is not intended to authorize
action against packages of food which are filled as full as practicable
in good manufacturing practice, even though shrinkage may occur
after the products are shipped." 34
In one case arising under subsection (d), it was held that machine-
filled packages of lozenges containing 18 or 19 pieces of candy were
not misbranded although they had an airspace equal to 33 per cent
of the total volume of the packages.35 Similarly, it was held that an
article which filled only 55 percent of its container, excluding space
taken by a removable inner liner, was not misbranded, as the con-
tainer was sanitary, convenient, and of a type reasonably necessary
to properly package and handle the product.36 On the other hand,
in a proceeding for condemnation of a quantity of frozen strawberries,
they were held misbranded although the packages were 75 percent
full.3 7
This apparent conflict should not be disturbing. As one court aptly
phrased it:38
There is no hard and fast rule as to what would constitute slack-
filling. Whether or not over 50 per cent space in a particular package of
candy was slack-filling is a question of fact for the district court to
decide .... Moreover, the court held that it could not as a matter of
aaw say either that the product has been misbranded or that its "con-
tainers are so made, formed or filled as to be misleading."
Package Form
A food shall be deemed misbranded, according to section 403 (e):39
If in package form unless it bears a label containing (1) the name
and place of business of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor; and
(2) an accurate statement of the quantity of the contents in terms of
weight, measure, or numerical count: Provided, That under clause (2) of
this paragraph reasonable variations shall he permitted, and exemptions
as to small packages shall be established, by regulations prescribed by
the [Administrator]....
The obvious purpose of part (1) is to compel manufacturers, packers,
and others, who would not freely acknowledge their products, to place
33 52 STAT. 1046 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 341 (1946).
34 SEN. REP. No. 361, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1935).
35 United States v. 116 Boxes, etc., Arden Assorted Candy Drops, 80 F. Supp.
911 (D. Mass. 1948).
36 United States v. 738 Cases..., 71 F. Supp. 279 (D. Ariz. 1946).
37 United States v. 31 Cases . . . , Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Notice
of judgment No. 14934, March, 1950.
38 United States v. Cataldo, 157 F. (2d) 802, 804 (1st Cir. 1946).
39 52 STAT. 1047 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 343(e) (1946).
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their names and addresses on the label. Before this subsection took effect
in 1938, some manufacturers labeled their inferior food products with
fictitious names and addresses. 40
Part (2) of this subsection restates one of the time-proven pro-
visions of the 1906 Act, which required a statement of the quantity
of the contents in terms of weight or measure to be ". . . plainly and
correctly marked on the outside of the package .... ", 41 As in the
1906 Act, reasonable variations, tolerances and exemptions were to be
established. In the oft-cited case, United States v. Shreveport Grain &
Elevator Co.,42 it was held that the 1906 statute was not open to the
constitutional objection of uncertainty in defining the offense, because
of the variations and exemptions allowable. The Court also ruled that
the Act did not authorize an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power.
The regulations which have been promulgated by the Administrator
are detailed and voluminous. Some of the more important regula-
tions provide, inter alia, that the statement of contents must be in form
and wording familiar to consumers; 43 common fractions are to be re-
duced to lowest terms;44 and the largest possible units of measure
should be used-for example, 1 quart, not 2 pints.45 However, figures
may be reduced where there are large fractions, e.g., 1374 quarts could
be reduced to 1 quart, 12 pints.4 6 Minimum or average quantity is
to be stated on the package and no variation below the minimum is
permissible except as to food which normally decreases in weight or
volume in transit.4 7 If the distributor of the product, whose name
appears on the label, is not also the manufacturer, the label must state,
"Manufactured for and packed by . . . ," or "Distributed by . . . "48
Under the provision of the 1906 Act, which corresponds to section
403 (e) of the present statute, many precedents were established which
are still applicable because of the similarity between the two laws. In
United States v. Rigney & Co.,49 the use of "commercial" or approxi-
mate measures was held to constitute misbranding. The fact that in
the trade, quantities were customarily stated in liquid or solid measure-
ments which closely approximated but did not actually describe the
quantity, the products being labeled as containing a commercial quart,
etc., did not prevent the label from being "misleading" under the old
40 TOUL~MI, TE LAw oF FOOD, DRuGs AND CosmTcs § 146 (1st Ed. 1942).
41 34 STAT. 771 (1906).
42 287 U. S. 77, 53 S. Ct. 42, 77 L. Ed. 175 (1932).
43 21 CODE FED. REs. § 1.8(e) (2) (1949).
44 21 CODE FED. R.Es. § 1.8(g) (1949).
45 21 CODE FED. REGs. § 1.8(h)(1) (1949).
46 Ibid.
47 21 CODE FED. REGS. § 1.8(j) (1949).
48 21 CODE FE. RGs. § 1.8(a) (1949).
49 220 Fed. 734 (E. D. N. Y. 1915).
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Act. In United States v. Feeders' Supply & MIg. Co.,5O animal feed,
branded ". . . guaranteed analysis-protein not less than 43 %," ac-
tually had a maximum protein content of 38.56%. Referring to the
reasonable variations permitted, the court said that the statute pro-
hibiting misbranding would not allow any variation, however slight,
from the truth in labels which must list the ingredients or percentages
of them contained in food.
On the other hand, in United States v. Kraft Phenix Cheese Corp.,51
cheese was sold in packages marked "3/ lb. net weight." Although
59 out of 60 packages were found to be approximately 4 ounce under-
weight, while only one was slightly overweight, the court held that this
slight deficiency was not a misbranding since there was no evidence
that it was not a reasonable variance.
The regulations under the 1938 Act eliminated several of the in-
consistencies in the old Act by expressly providing that the only varia-
tions in contents permissible are those resulting from exposure to con-
ditions after entering interstate commerce, or those normally resulting
even under good packing practice. 52 These variations are not per-
missible to the extent that the average quantity in the shipment falls
below the stated quantity, ". . . and no unreasonable shortage in any
package shall be permitted, even though overages in other packages
in the same shipment or delivery compensate for such shortage." 53
Judging from the complex requirements of the regulations under
section 403(e), compliance is obviously difficult. The manufacturer,
packer or distributor of food should study this section thoroughly and
plan his marketing and labeling practices accordingly, lest he run afoul
of the statute or regulations through a technical, albeit innocent, viola-
tion.54
Prominence of Display of Information on Label
The requirements of section 403 (f) will render a food misbranded: 55
If any word, statement, or other information required by or under
authority of this Act to appear on the label or labeling is not promi-
nently placed thereon with such conspicuousness (as compared with other
words, statements, designs, or devices, in the labeling) and in such terms
as to render it likely to be read and understood by the ordinary individ-
ual under customary conditions of purchase and use.
50 15 F. Supp. 385 (W. D. Mo. 1936).
51 18 F. Supp. 60 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
52 21 CoDE FED. REGs. §§ 1.8(j), (k) (1949).
53 21 CoDE FED. REGs. § 1.8(k) (2) (1949).
54 For illustrations of the application of section 403(e) and supplementary
regulations, see Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Notices of judgment Nos. 15282,
15232, 15222, 15221, May 1950; Nos. 14938, 14934, 14915 and 14913, March 1950.
55 52 STAT. 1047 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 343(f) (1946).
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The net effect of section 403(f) is a requirement of notoriety.58
Words cannot be hidden from the public by placing them on the bot-
tom of the container, or on one side only, if two sides are likely to be
presented to the public. 57 Insufficient label space 58 and small in-
conspicuous type or inadequate background contrast 59 must be avoided.
An additional problem arises where the product is manufactured or
packaged for foreign distribution. All words, statements, and other
information required under the Act must be in English; 60 and if the
label contains any representation in a foreign language, then all the
information required by the Act also must be included on the label
in the foreign language. 61 The use of two panels, one bearing the re-
quired information in English and the other in the foreign language,
seems to be the best solution.
Representations as to Definition and Standard of Identity of Food
Section 403 (g) 62 provides that a food is misbranded if it is repre-
sented to be a food for which a definition and standard of identity
has been established,63 unless it conforms to the definition and standard.
The label must bear the name of the food specified in the definition
as well as the common names of any optional ingredients (excluding
spices, flavoring, and coloring).64
Cases arising under this subsection have been of two types: those
where an imitation food, represented to be an imitation of a food for
which a standard of identity has been established, fails to conform to
the standard; and those where a food, represented to be one for which
a standard of identity has been established, fails to conform.
The recent Jam case, 65 previously discussed, illustrates the first situa-
tion. There, the product was plainly labeled an imitation but the Gov-
ernment contended that it was represented to be a food for which
a standard and definition was specified. By holding that the imitation
56 United States v. 246 Cases . . . , Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act Notice
of Judgment No. 15645, May, 1950. Peanut oil contained artificial color and the
declaration of its presence was not prominently placed so as to make it likely
to be read and understood by the ordinary individual under customary condi-
tions of purchase and use, since the individual cans did not bear labels listing
the artificial color.
57 21 CODEFED. Ras. § 1.9(a)(2) (1949).
58 21 CODE FED. REGs. § 1.9(a) (4) (1949).
59 21 CODE FED. RaG. § 1.9(a)(6) (1949).
60 21 CODE FED. R~cs. § 1.9(c)(1) (1949).
61 21 CODE FED. REGs. §§ 1.9(c)(2), (3) (1949).
62 52 STAT. 1047 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 343(g) (1946).
63 52 STAT. 1046 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 341 (1946). See note 22 supra.
64 Section 403(k) exempts butter, cheese, and ice cream from the provisions
of Section 403(g).
65 62 Cases, More or Less, Each Containing Six Jars of Jam, et al. v. United
States, 340 U. S ..... 71 S. Ct. 515, 95 L. Ed- .... (1951).
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was not represented to be the standardized food, the Court clarified the
difference between regulation of imitations under section 403(c), and
regulations of foods for which a definition and standard had been an-
nounced under section 403 (g).
In the second situation an apparent hardship exists. A food product
designated "Fruit Spread" was found to be misbranded because it
failed to meet the standard set for the food it was represented to be,66
i.e., preservesY' Since the Act makes no provision for the marketing
of products which fail to conform to the applicable standard of identity,
the product must meet the standard; it cannot merely be labeled "sub-
standard" and marketed as such. 68 The rationale of this rule is that
by limiting the types of food, confusion of the public is avoided.
The addition of an ingredient which has no effect on the taste or
appearance of a product in a standardized category will not take the
product out of the class.6 9 A close question of this nature was decided
in Federal Security Administrator v. Quaker Oats Co., 70 in which the
manufacturer had for ten years added vitamin D to the farina which
it marketed as a cereal. When the regulations of the Administrator
were promulgated, it was found that the product could not be sold as
farina any longer because the vitamin D which it contained rendered
it slightly different from the standardized farina. And it could not be
marketed as enriched farina because it did not contain the additional
vitamins required in that category. Nevertheless the Court held that
the definitions and standards formulated by the Administrator were
reasonable and that the Quaker Oats Co. must either remove the vita-
min D to produce farina or add the additional minerals and vitamins
to produce enriched farina. The Court undoubtedly was convinced
66 United States v. 30 Cases, More or Less, Leader Brand Strawberry Fruit
Spread, etc., 93 F. Supp. 764 (S. D. Iowa 1950).
67 For a similar case concerning preserves see United States v. Ninety-Nine
Cases, etc., Southland Fountain Fruit et al., 89 F. Supp. 992 (E. D. Tenn. 1949).
Jars containing peach and pineapple product were labeled with the name of the
fruit in large letters and the words "Fountain Fruit" in small letters. These words
represented the product as a spread. It was held to be misbranded since it "pur-
ported" to contain "preserves."
68 United States v. 30 Cases, More or Less, Leader Brand Strawberry Fruit
Spread, etc., 93 F. Supp. 764, 770 (S. D. Iowa 1950): "The use of a statement
on the label that an article of food falls below the standard of quality, or below
the standard of fill of the container is permitted ...but no such permission is
granted... where the article of food fails to conform to the applicable standard
of identity. [Emphasis supplied.]
69 Tomato catsup met the standard of identity even though sodium benzoate
had been added as a preservative. The food was labeled, "Tomato Catsup with
Preservative." United States v. 306 Cases Containing Sandford Tomato Catsup
with Preservative, 55 F. Supp. 725 (E. D. N. Y. 1944), aff'd sub nom., Libby,
McNeill and Libby v. United States, 148 F. (2d) 71 (2d Cir. 1945).
70 318 U. S. 218,63 S. Ct. 589, 87 L. Ed. 724 (1943).
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that the added vitamin changed the product even though the taste and
appearance might have remained unaffected.
Representations as to Quality and Quantity
While the marketing of products failing to comply with the defini-
tion and standard of identity is forbidden under section 403(g), dis-
cussed above, section 403 (h) 71 expressly allows the marketing of food
which fails to meet the standard of quality or the standard of fill of
container outlined by the Administrator. Of course, this inferior qual-
ity or slack-filled food must be adequately labeled as such. This differ-
ence in the phraseology of subsections (g) and (h) was recognized and
given effect until the Supreme Court decided the Jam case, 72 where an
imitation of a food which had a standard of identity was allowed to be
marketed. While this case did not authorize the marketing of food
which fails to conform to the standard of identity of the product which
it is represented to be, it did disturb the orthodox view. It remains for
a court in the future to decide that farina, for example, represented and
sold as such but in fact slightly different, may be marketed if labeled
"substandard." However that may be, it is clear that subsection (h)
allows a departure from standards of quality and fill provided the label
clearly reveals it.
The standards of quality and fill prescribed by the Administrator
may be challenged as unreasonable.73 Of course, a court in reviewing
the regulation or standard will not substitute its judgment for that of
the Administrator, 74 and ". . . his findings are to be accepted as
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence, provided always, how-
ever, they are within statutory and constitutional limitations." 75
Obviously, the most frequent violations of this subsection arise from
the bold failure to disclose the inferior quality 76 or short measure 77
on the label, since there is no problem of strict compliance to nebulous
identity as demanded by subsection (g).
71 52 STAT. 1047 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 343 (1946).
72 62 Cases, More or Less, Each Containing Six Jars of Jam, et al. v. United
States, 340 U. S ..... 71 S. Ct. 515, 95 L. Ed..... (1951).
73 A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture et al., 120 F. (2d) 258
(7th Cir. 1941).
74 Columbia Cheese Co. et al. v. McNutt, 137 F. (2d) 576 (2d Cir. 1943).
75 United States v. Lord-Mott Co., 57 F. Supp. 128, 133 (D. Md. 1944).
76 Typical of decisions rendered under section 403(h) is United States v. 35
Cases . . . , Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Notice of Judgment No. 14841, Feb-
ruary, 1950, where a quantity of canned pears failed to comply with subsection
(h) (1) because the weight of the largest unit in the container was more than
twice the weight of the smallest unit, many units were untrimmed and broken,
and primarily because the label failed to state that the contents fell below standard.
77 See e.g., United States v. 94 Cases . . . , Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
Notice of Judgment No. 14840, February, 1950, where a quantity of canned apri-
cots was condemned because the containers were not filled to the level required
by the standard of fill and the labels failed to Teveal this discrepancy.
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Label Requirements Where There Is No Representation as to
Definition and Standard of Identity
According to section 403 (i),78 nonstandardized foods are to labeled
with their common names.7 9 All of the major ingredients must be listed
by name,80 while spices, flavoring and coloring are designated merely
as "spice," etc., and not by specific name. When compliance is im-
practicable, or results in deception or unfair competition, the Admin-
istrator may authorize exemptions.
The Code of Federal Regulations exemplifies the requirements of
this subsection with great detail. The name of the food must be specific
and not collective."' No ingredient may be designated as a spice,
coloring or flavoring unless it is commonly known as one, and a bleach-
ing substance is not to be termed a coloring. 2 Under the regulations,
a label may be misleading because of the order in which the ingredients
are listed,83 the relative prominence assigned an ingredient,8 4 or be-
cause of a failure to reveal the true proportion of the ingredients.8 5
An excellent statement of the legislative policy motivating the enact-
ment of not only subsection (i) but of all the labeling provisions, is
found in the Senate Committee Reports submitted while the 1938 Act
was being drafted:8 6
This requirement [labeling] is necessary to discourage the practice of
coining a fanciful, high-sounding name for a product composed largely
of cheap ingredients, which could not be extensively marketed at the
exorbitant prices charged except by cloaking its identity under such a
name ..... On the other hand, proprietary food composed of valuable
ingredients will gain public confidence and goodwill from this disclosure.
It should be noted that this provision does not compel the disclosure of
the formulas of such food since no information as to proportions is re-
quired and flavors, spices, and colors need not be specifically named.
78 52 STAT. 1048 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 343(i) (1946).
79 An interesting case decided under this requirement of subsection (i) is
United States v. Lakeside Fish and Oyster Co., Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
Notice of Judgment No. 16263, November, 1950. There frozen pollock fillets were
offered for sale under the name frozen haddock fillets. They were deemed mis-
branded under sections 403(b) and 403(i) (1) because the label did not bear the
common or usual name.
80 Coming under this requirement of section 403(i) is United States v. 100
Drums ... , Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act Notice of Judgment No. 16477, De-
cember, 1950, where the labeling on animal feed failed to comply because a clay-
like material added to give the product a better appearance was not mentioned
on the label.
81 21 CODE FED. REGs. § 1.10(a) (1949).
82 21 CODE FED. Rms. § 1.10(b) (1949).
83 21 CODE FED. Racs. § 1.10(d) (1) (1949).
84 Ibid.
85 21 CODE FED. REGs. § 1.10(d) (2) (1949).
86 SEN. REP. No. 361, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935).
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Labeling of Special Dietary Foods
Section 403(j) 87 requires foods which are represented to be for
dietary purposes to bear labels listing the vitamin and mineral content
and similar properties. The regulations issued by the Administrator
reveal the general aims and purposes of this subsection. One regulation
points out that the "special dietary uses" referred to in the subsection
include, "Uses for supplying particular dietary needs which exist by
reason of a physical, physiological, pathological or other condition." 8
Included among these conditions are those of disease, convalescence,
pregnancy, lactation, allergic hypersensitivity to food, underweight and
overweight. 89 Other special dietary uses are those which supply dietary
needs arising because of age 90 and for fortifying the normal diet.91
In a proceeding before the Administrator, 92 a mineral-vitamin prepa-
ration was found to be misbranded under subsection (j) because its
label failed to bear the required statement of minimum daily require-
ments supplied by the product, but substituted instead a statement that
the daily requirements for several of the vitamins and minerals had
not been established.
This subsection potentially is one of the most important provisions
of the Act because of the enormous increase in demand for vitamin and
mineral-enriched foods. Considering the possibilities of fraud upon
a public so eager to obtain more enriched and beneficial foods, it is
patent that a checkrein upon the producers of these commodities is
vitally important.
Artificial Flavoring, Coloring and Chemical Preservatives
Section 403 (k) 93 is designed to regulate the incidentals in food
preparations, flavorings, colorings and preservatives. While these could
be regulated under the general provisions of the Act, the wide use of
chemical preservatives and artificial coloring justifies a separate sub-
section. Generally, all artificial flavorings and colorings as well as
chemical preservatives added to the product must be declared on the
label whether the commodity is in package form or not.94 They need
not be specifically identified, however.
87 52 STAT. 1048 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 343(j) (1946).
88 21 CODE FED. REGS. § 1.11(a)(1) (1949).
89 Ibid.
90 21 CODE FED. REGS. § 1.11(a)(2) (1949).
91 21 CODE FED. REGs. § 1.11(a) (3) (1949).
92 United States v. Helios Foods, Inc., and Harry H. Grahn (Min-E-Vita
Products Co.), Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act Notice of Judgment No. 16194,
September, 1950. See also United States v. 18 Bottles ... , Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act Notice of Judgment No. 15398, May, 1950.
93 52 STAT. 1048 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 343(k) (1946).
94 21 CODE FED. RE-s. § 1.12(c) (1949), states: "A statement of artificial
flavoring, artificial coloring, or chemical preservative shall be placed on the food,
